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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Questions in Kabul: 
An Introduction to the Political Geography of Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards the end of my last visit to Afghanistan in the summer of 2010, I 
stopped in at the Kabul office of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies to 
type up the notes from my final interviews. While I was there, I crossed paths with a 
well-known American anthropologist who was also visiting Afghanistan. As we made 
small talk, he mentioned that he had been coming to Afghanistan regularly since the 
early 1970s and that things seemed to get worse every year. His statement left me 
questioning how a country which, at different times had seemed to be the focus of the 
development and modernizing efforts of two superpowers, and with a current 
government that once was considered a model of the Western effort to promote 
democracy in the Middle East could continue to deteriorate. After I left Kabul, I spent 
a few days in neighboring Tajikistan waiting for my connecting flight home. The 
paved roads, generally garbage-less streets, and absence of the prospect for sudden 
violence made me feel as if I was in Western Europe instead of on Afghanistan’s 
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northern border. I wondered: How could these two countries, which share a religion, 
language, and several ethnic groups, be so completely different? Why has 
Afghanistan not developed into a modern state?  
 The answer, I believe, is governance. The political landscape of Afghanistan 
is dominated by tribal, ethnic, kinship and locality-based forms of social organization, 
collectively referred to with the Arabic gloss qawm. The most approximate English 
translation for this term, as it is used in Afghanistan, is a kin or locality-based 
solidarity structure. Across Afghanistan, these structures are the primary sources of 
security, social order, justice, and economic development in their communities. In 
short, for most Afghans, their qawm is the government. Different national 
governments throughout Afghan history have adopted various approaches to 
confronting these non-state governance structures. Before the nineteenth century, 
societal groups were permitted a large degree of autonomy, so long as they did not 
oppose the interests of the monarchy. Since the 1880s, however, successive Afghan 
rulers have attempted to break the power of local governance structures by asserting 
the political, economic, and social authority of the central state. This effort has largely 
failed and Afghanistan remains a weak state mired in violence.  
 This thesis will seek to explain the reasons behind the current crisis in 
Afghanistan by examining the political and cultural history of the land and the people 
between the Oxus and the Hindu Kush from prehistory to the fall of Taliban. I hope to 
demonstrate that the weakness of the contemporary Afghan state is rooted in political 
and social conditions that are observable throughout history. By considering historical 
developments through theoretical approaches to tribe-state relations, we will see that 
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the contemporary crisis of governance in Afghanistan is a product of attempts by 
recent state leaders to discard established and successful styles of governance and rule 
in a manner that is antithetical to Afghanistan’s political culture. Rather than view 
poor governance as the natural condition of Afghanistan, this thesis argues that 
Afghanistan can be governed successfully.   
Before beginning a wider analysis, however, it is first necessary to understand 
Afghanistan’s political geography. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state that is 
comprised of dozens of small and large ethnic groups, each with relatively distinct 
cultural and linguistic traits. The most politically significant of these groups is the 
Pashtuns. Comprising about forty percent of the population, Pashtuns are Sunni 
Muslims who are divided into four large descent groups: Sarbans, Batani, Gharghasht 
and Karlanri. These are, in turn, composed of multiple tribal and subtribal elements. 
Because the Pashtun are segmentary, meaning that their tribal association is based on 
decent from a common ancestor, the size of these tribal and subtribal units can vary 
significantly according the circumstances.1 In times of war with an outside power, for 
example, Pashtuns have formed temporary coalitions that lasted until the external 
threat was removed.2 Among the Pashtun descent groups, the Durrani, a sub-section 
of the Sarbans, have provided the ruling class of Afghanistan since the mid eighteenth 
century. With the exceptions of the brief rule of Habibullah Kalakani in 1929 and the  
Soviet, Civil War and Taliban periods from 1978-2001, all of Afghanistan’s leaders 
                                                 
1 Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the 
Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Phillip S. Khoury and Joseph 
Kostiner. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), 69.  
2 Robert Canfield, “Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Alignments in Afghanistan,” in The State Religion, 
and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1986), 80.  
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 Figure 1.1 Macro Distribution of Ethnicities of Afghanistan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map by Gilles Dorronsoro, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2009 
 
 
have been Durrani Pashtuns. The current president, Hamid Karzai, is a member of the 
Popalzai tribe, which is part of the same descent group as Ahmad Shah Durrani, the 
first Pashtun monarch of Afghanistan.   
Afghanistan’s other ethnic groups, in order of largest to smallest, are: Tajiks, 
Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turkmen, Aymaqs, Nuristanis and Pashais, Qizilbashs, 
Baluchis, Arabs, Pamiris, Jugis and Jats, Kirghiz, and Hindus. Not all of these groups 
are indigenous to Afghanistan and tribal and ethnic identities often transcend the 
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borders of the modern Afghan state.3 This is the case for Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, 
Kirghiz, Pamiris, Baluch, and Nuristanis, among others. Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, 
with the exception of Hindus, are Muslim; and all of the Muslim groups, except the 
Hazara, Qizilbash, and Pamiri are Sunni.  
Some ethnic groups, such as the Pashtuns, are tribal; while others, such as the 
Tajiks are non-tribal. The chief difference between tribal and non-tribal ethnic groups 
is that tribes “define membership through the unilineal descent from a common 
ancestor, real or assumed.”4 Non-tribal groups, in contrast, do not make a 
genealogical claim of association between its members. Both types of groups, 
nevertheless, possess what medieval Arab polymath Ibn Khaldun called asabiyyah. 
Derived from the Arabic root for “to bind together,” asabiyyah is commonly 
translated as “group-feeling,” which Ibn Khaldun argues is “a natural urge in man.”5 
In his undergraduate thesis on tribalism in Oman, William J. Burke quotes Omani 
scholar Sulaiman Abdulsalaam, who describes asabiyyah as: 
A conscious and unconscious social and psychological league that 
connects the individuals of a certain group based on ongoing 
lineage relationships. This league appears and strengthens in the 
case of danger that would threaten the life of its members. 
Consequently ‘asabiyyah towards the group’ transforms from a 
potential feeling in contexts of confrontations into an effective and 
powerful feeling for collective grouping and support. Hence, 
asabiyyah is the power of the group that instills the ability to 
encounter other threats.6 
 
                                                 
3 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 57.  
4 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 22.  
5 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Fran Rozenthal. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958), Vol. 1, 264.  
6 Quoted in William J. Burke, Tribe and State in the 21st Century: The Tribe-ocracy of Oman. BA 
thesis. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, 2010, from Mohammed Aabid, Al,asabiyah Wad,dawlah: 
Ma'alem Nazariyah  Fit,tarikh Aleslami. (The Asabiyah and the State: Khaldounic Theoretical 
Features in Islamic History), (Beirut: Markaz Derasat Alwehdah Alarabiyah, 1992).  
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The strength of these asabiyyah ties among Afghanistan’s qawm groups directly 
impacts the ability of the state to penetrate societal groups and govern effectively.  
Describing governance patterns in Afghanistan, however, poses some 
methodological challenges. The complexity and multiplicity of Afghanistan’s local 
political communities make it extremely difficult to provide a single explanation for 
center-periphery relations throughout the country. The reasons behind one qawm 
group’s resistance to the state may be the same as another’s acquiescence. Similarly, 
it is inaccurate to indicate passivity or resistance to centralization based on broad 
characteristics, such as whether a qawm is tribal. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Afghan state, it is necessary to 
analyze how the state has interacted with each different group. Such a broad and 
comprehensive analysis would be outside the scope of this thesis. For this reason, I 
have chosen to focus on the reactions of the Pashtuns, Panjsheris and the Nuristanis to 
attempts at state centralization.  
 The Panjsheris are members of the Tajik ethnic group who are defined by 
their geographical distribution around the Panjsher Valley, about sixty miles north of 
Kabul. Tajiks are Dari-speaking Sunni Muslims that comprise about thirty percent of 
Afghanistan’s population. Their non-tribal qawm relations are locality-based. The 
inaccessibility of the Panjsher Valley has helped guarantee Panjsheri relative 
autonomy and independence from the central government. While the area typically 
acknowledged the Afghan monarch, it was not until the 1880s that the central 
government asserted sovereignty in the Panjsher. In the last century, Panjsheris have 
resisted attempts at state incorporation. In 1929, they supported the Tajik Habibullah 
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Kalakani as he overthrew and briefly ruled Afghanistan. During the Soviet War, the 
fierce resistance of the Panjsheris under the command of Ahmad Shah Massoud 
transformed the valley into an international cause célèbre. After the fall of the 
communist government and the rise of the Taliban, the Panjsheris secured materiel 
assistance from France, Russia, and Iran and preserved the independence of their 
valley. To this day, Panjsheris will point to the mouth of the valley as the line past 
which the Taliban did not advance. Following the U.S. invasion, the Panjsheris 
emerged as key power-holders in the new state. It is likely that, had Massoud not 
been assassinated by al-Qaeda two days before the September 11 attacks, he would 
have become the first Panjsheri national leader in Afghan history.  
  The Nuristanis are a tribal ethnic group that inhabit the mountainous region 
of northeastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border. They are culturally, 
linguistically, and were, until the late nineteenth century, religiously different from 
other tribes in Afghanistan. The Nuristani speak five distinct Indo-Iranian languages, 
and are divided into fifteen tribes, each with numerous sub-tribal divisions. These 
tribal divisions are not as formal as those of the segmented Pashtuns, and like the 
Panjsheris, they are largely defined by locality. Unlike most groups in Afghanistan, 
Nuristani culture values individuality and simple societal arrangements. This is 
reflected in the Nuristani language, which does not have indigenous words for 
complex social groupings, such as “tribe” or “lineage.”7 Until 1896, they were 
referred to as Kafir, or infidel, by their Muslim neighbors because they practiced an 
animistic polytheistic religion. After their territory was conquered by Abdur Rahman, 
                                                 
7 Richard Strand, “Anti-Communist Resistance in Eastern Nuristan,” in Revolutions and Rebellions in 
Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Nazif Shahrani and Robert Canfield. (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1984), 79.  
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most converted to Islam, and the province was renamed Nuristan, or “Land of the 
Light.” Despite the official conversion, they have retained many of their pre-Islamic 
customs, such as their ornate grave markings.  
Like the Panjsheris, the Nuristanis were independent from Kabul until their 
defeat by Abdur Rahman the end of the nineteenth century. While they enjoyed 
generally positive relations with the monarchy, the state never succeeded in 
penetrating Nuristani society. Consequently, the Nuristanis were the first to revolt 
against the Soviet-backed government in 1978. Also like the Panjsher, Nuristan never 
fell to Soviet forces. After the war, even the Taliban did not succeed subduing the 
province. Instead, the Pashtun-dominated social movement replicated the successful 
strategies of previous Afghan governments and ruled through local leaders. Since 
2001, Nuristanis have strongly resisted U.S. and Afghan efforts to bring the province 
under government control.  
Panjsheris and Nuristanis are ideal case studies for understanding the 
problems of governance in Afghanistan. Both are outside of the traditionally Pashtun-
dominated state structure and enjoyed independence until the end of the nineteenth 
century. They were also essentially autonomous under the monarchy and strongly 
resisted the Soviet invasion. The major differences between the two, furthermore, 
help our analysis of patterns of governance across Afghanistan. As non-tribal Persian 
speakers who have a stable relationship with the current government, Panjsheris can 
serve as an indicator for the behaviors of other non-tribal groups, such as the Tajik, 
Uzbek, Hazara, Turkmen, and Aymaq. In contrast, the Nuristanis reflect the difficulty 
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of the central government to incorporate similar tribal communities, such as the 
Pashai and many non-Durrani Pashtun groups.  
In seeking to explain governance in Afghanistan, this thesis must first begin 
by providing a theoretical approach to understanding Afghanistan’s political history. 
The next chapter evaluates several political and anthropological models for 
explaining the behavior of the state and the tribes across Afghanistan’s history. The 
following three chapters will describe the historical evolution of Afghanistan–from 
Darius to the fall of the Taliban–with an eye toward the Panjsheri and Nuristani 
reaction to the expansion of the state. Finally, the thesis will conclude by examining 
post-2001 developments and exploring some successful approaches to governance.  
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that Afghanistan is governable. In 
the next few years, some in the West are likely to advocate the opposite as they seek 
to justify a hasty military exit from Afghanistan. Such an argument ignores Afghan 
political history and robs the Afghan people of a chance at stability in order to satisfy 
short-term Western political exigencies. In 2009, the U.S.-led Coalition began to 
increase the size of its forces in Afghanistan as it sought to replicate the successful 
counterinsurgency strategies implemented in Iraq. In addition to this military “surge,” 
Afghanistan also needs to find new approaches to governance in accordance with its 
established qawm-based political culture. I hope that this thesis will be a part of this 
much-needed “intellectual surge.”  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
The State-Society Balance of Power: 
Theoretical Approaches to Tribe-State Relations in Afghanistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defining the roots of the problem of governance in contemporary Afghanistan 
requires locating individual political developments in their proper historical contexts. 
Dupree, Shahrani, and Barfield provide three approaches to understanding the 
recurring trends and themes of Afghanistan’s political history. First, as suggested by 
Dupree, there is an oscillation between state fusion and fission that is caused mainly 
by the state’s reliance on tribal confederations. Second, as Shahrani has argued, there 
is process of state centralization throughout Afghan history which represents an 
attempt by one tribe to camouflage its rule over other groups as state-building. 
Finally, Barfield offers an explanation of the successful and unsuccessful approaches 
taken by rulers in Afghanistan which challenges the notion that Afghanistan is 
ungovernable from the center and offers a framework for how Afghanistan was 
successfully ruled in the past. The present chapter provides an overview of these 
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approaches to Afghanistan’s history and contemporary politics with a focus on the 
relationship between state and society.  
 
Internal Imperialism – Fusion and Fission  
Throughout Afghan history leaders have not sought to build nation-states, but 
rather have created political systems that more closely resemble empires. Power is 
distributed to family members and close allies while potential challengers are 
excluded or eliminated. Dupree explains the typical political life-cycle of early 
Afghanistan:  
A charismatic leader arises in a tribal society and, by military 
power, intrigue, and judiciously arranged marriages, unites several 
tribes into a confederation, which spreads as far as its accumulated 
power permits, creating an empire, not a nation-state. With 
(sometimes before) the death of the emperor, fission occurs, and 
the great empire once again segments into a multiplicity of tribal 
kingdoms. Later, another charismatic leader arrives and the process 
is repeated.1 
  
By relying on temporary federations, these internal empires failed to create a normal 
system for the transmission of political power. As a result, for example, once the 
motivation for intra-tribal unity (external threats, charismatic leadership, etc.) faded, 
so too did the prospect of continued national unity. Dupree calls this phenomenon 
“the process of alternating fusion and fission.”2  
   
“Internal Colonialism”   
A result of the creation of “internal empires” is the state’s practice of 
governing non-Durrani groups through what Shahrani terms “internal colonialism.” 
                                                 
1 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), xix. 
2 Ibid. 
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While consensus was used to forge tribal confederations among the leader’s kin 
group, other ethnic and tribal groups were integrated into the state through ethnic 
cleansing, forced relocation, and the killing of tribal leaders.3 At the same time, the 
government enhanced the position of the dominant tribes in relation to its ethnic and 
tribal rivals by promoting Pashtun-centric policies that “denied the existence of 
‘other’, non-Pashtun ethnolinguistic communities.”4 Not surprisingly, the practice of 
internal colonialism has led to the empowerment of the very local leaders that the 
state has tried to undermine. Shahrani explains that, in response to government 
attempts to undermine their identity and autonomy, local communities  
devised complex social mechanisms to insulate themselves from 
direct contact with government agents…[such as] creating 
community-based parallel power structures (that is, a strong 
Shari’a governed civil society) to resolve internal problems locally 
through trusted leaders, both religious and secular.5  
 
Barfield identified the same development during his fieldwork in the 1970s, when he 
noted that, “the Afghan government seemed remote to the local residents. There was 
no organic connection between them and the government-appointed officials.”6 
Though the state was expanding and modernizing, its tribal character prevented it 
from penetrating and transforming society.  
 
Swiss and American Cheese Approaches  
 The internal colonial strategy of state building has been characterized by 
Barfield as an “American Cheese approach in which each slice is expected to be 
                                                 
3 Nazif Shahrani, “The Future of the Sate and the Structure of Community Governance in 
Afghanistan,” in Fundamentalism Reborn?, ed. William Maley. (London: Hurst & Co., 1988), 219. 
4 Ibid, 222-3.  
5 Ibid, 225. 
6 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 222. 
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uniform in texture and the same as any other…State control is deemed to be 
theoretically universal and absolute within its boundaries, whether one is in the 
capital or at its farthest margins.”7 Although no Afghan state has ever been ruled 
effectively in this way, most rulers since the 1880s have attempted the “American 
Cheese” approach to governance. According to Barfield, American Cheese 
governance is not suitable in areas once governed by Turco-Persian empires, where 
rulers “sought direct control of [population] centers and the lines of communication 
among them while largely ignoring the rest” of the “territories deemed unprofitable to 
rule or of little strategic value.” This “Swiss Cheese” approach to governance does 
not “assume uniformity across the landscape or their control of it.” You expect to find 
holes in the state’s control; however, these holes “do not constitute defects (as they 
would in American cheese) but are instead the products of the very process that 
created the cheese in the first place.”8  
 The Swiss Cheese approach, Barfield argues, is “the most successful model of 
Afghan governance” because it does not compete with the strong, local power 
structures. According to this explanation, those that lived in the “holes” of central 
authority were permitted to live as they desired, so long as they did not challenge the 
state. If they did, the state engaged in punitive measures that demonstrated the cost of 
resistance. The purpose of this approach was “to intimidate the population and its 
leaders into acquiescence without changing the existing political structure.”9 For 
many centuries, this was the norm in Afghan politics.  
                                                 
7 Ibid, 67. 
8  Ibid, 68.  
9 Ibid, 338.  
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 The temporary successes of centralized rule in the late nineteenth century, 
however, convinced subsequent Afghan rulers that an American Cheese model would 
work forever. Ignoring the historical swings between fusion and fission and the 
unintended consequences of internal colonialism, these rulers sought to impose a 
single administration that forcefully suppressed local governance structures. This 
includes the Karzai government, which Barfield suggests is seeking to “restore a 
direct rule model that remains at odds with the realities of Afghanistan, especially 
rural Afghanistan, and the Kabul government lacks the military and administrative 
capacity to implement it.”10  
 
Strong Societies and Weak States 
Dupree, Shahrani, and Barfield’s models explain how the state acts towards 
its societal groups, but do not account for the agency of qawm leaders, and therefore 
fail to provide a full explanation of the interaction between the state and societal 
groups in Afghanistan. Midgal and Waltz, however, provide models that suggests a 
societal group’s actions towards the state, while influenced by history, culture, and 
ideology, are shaped by the internal power distribution of the state. Generally, where 
societal groups are strong, the state tends to be weak, and vice-versa. Migdal has 
characterized this phenomenon as the inverse relationship between the strength of 
society and the capabilities of the state, thus arguing that “the emergence of a strong, 
capable state can occur only with a tremendous concentration of social control.”11 
Centralizing social authority is difficult in post-colonial states, which were once 
                                                 
10 Ibid.   
11 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the 
Third World. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 262.   
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governed by imperial policies that, in most cases, encouraged the fragmentation of 
social control. While Migdal is primarily writing on Africa, Latin America, and Asia, 
his theory also applies to Afghanistan, which, as Durpee and Shahrani have shown, 
experienced similar colonial polices that contributed to social fragmentation. 
Migdal’s assessment accurately describes the unintended consequences of this type of 
state formation:  
Colonial rulers used their advantage in power to direct resources 
and authority and to enforce sanctions in ways that deeply affected 
how indigenous forces reconstituted social control. They gave 
strongmen the wherewithal to build their social control in 
fragments of society.12 
  
This social fragmentation creates “an oligopoly of mobilization capacity” among the 
various social leaders, which challenge the government’s ability to access the 
population and mobilize resources. Such leaders remain more relevant than the state 
because they are “able to offer viable strategies of survival to those of their villages,” 
that the weak state is not.13  
 Migdal’s theory codes countries in a two-by-two matrix in which the strength 
of society determines the capabilities of the state. Countries with strong societies, 
defined by the accumulation of mobilization capabilities by strongmen–“chiefs, 
landlords, bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders, za’im, effendis, aghas, caciques, 
kulaks”–tend to produce diffused power arrangements that weaken the capabilities of 
the state.14 Conversely, where political, economic, and natural catastrophes produce 
“deep social dislocations” that weaken the “existing bases of social control and 
                                                 
12 Ibid, 141.  
13 Ibid, 210. 
14 Ibid, 32.  
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strategies of survival,” the state accumulates power.1 Such social turmoil in Europe in 
the fourteenth century was the “precondition for the creation of strong states” because 
it produced a political environment in which leaders were forced “to gain  
direct access to the population’s manpower and revenues” in order to mobilize against 
political and military rivals.2  
Migdal reserves the term “anarchical” for environments with weak states and 
weak societies. Usually, such countries are experiencing a period of state collapse and 
ideological upheaval, the latter of which challenges the role of traditional leadership.   
Migdal’s use of this term, however, is too limited, as the relationship between the 
weak state and strong society is also defined by an anarchic system. In this system, 
societal groups compete with each other and the state (which in the case of 
Afghanistan is essentially the institutionalization of the dominant qawm) for security 
and access to resources.  The  study  of the  competition between units in  an  anarchic  
                                                 
1 Ibid, 140. 
2 Ibid.  
Figure 2.1 Strong Societies and Weak States  
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system has been generally restricted to explaining the behavior of states in the 
international system, where each party “conducts its affairs in the brooding shadow of 
violence.”17 The prospect for war shapes action and creates a balance of power within 
the system. This approach to understanding political behavior usually does not apply 
to internal affairs, because, in most countries, the government “has a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force.” 18  However, taking Waltz’s definition of legitimacy as the 
means “to prevent and counter the private use of force,” we may conclude that, in 
strong society–weak state power configurations, the use of force is legitimized, not by 
the government, but by the societal leaders who can mobilize the population.19  
Despite the presence of anarchy in strong society–weak state environments, 
unit actors establish what Barth calls “a systematic set of rules governing inter-ethnic 
social encounters.”20 These rules create an environment that imposes costs on 
defection from the system (the illegitimate use of force). In this way, members of 
rival tribes, for example, refrain from killing each other or stealing each other’s goods 
because such actions might provoke a wider inter-tribal conflict that could 
reconfigure the balance of power in the system. Given these two factors–the 
monopoly on the legitimacy of internal violence and the limitation of external 
violence by system-wide rules–societal groups in weak states behave in a manner that 
is analogous to small powers in the international system.  
Tapper concurs with this conception, arguing that the state and tribe “are best 
thought of as two opposed modes of thought or models of organization that form a 
                                                 
17 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 102.  
18 Ibid, 104.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998), 16.  
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single system…This tribe-state system involves a constant tension.”21 Societal 
leaders, like state leaders, constantly evaluate their environment and pursue the 
course of action that will best serve their interest. Waltz describes the calculations 
made by state leaders in an anarchic system:  
If force is used by one state or its use is expected, the recourse of 
other states is to use force or be prepared to use it singly or in 
combination. No appeal can be made to a higher entity clothed 
with authority and equipped with the ability to act on its own 
initiative. Under such conditions the possibility that force will be 
used by one or another of the parties looms always as the threat in 
the background… [and] limits manipulations, moderates demands, 
and serves as an incentive for the settlement of disputes.22 
  
How leaders respond to the prospect of violence is conditioned by the organizational 
capability and resources of their respective groups. Leaders of dominant powers in 
the system have the capabilities and resources to contend with other powers in the use 
of the force. Leaders of smaller powers, like societal groups in power-diffuse 
environments, generally lack the capability to respond to external threats individually, 
and rely on alliances that are designed either to “balance (ally in opposition to the 
principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the major 
threat).”23 When small powers are more vulnerable to the demands of dominant 
powers because of the latter’s geographic proximity and strong offensive capability, 
they are more likely to bandwagon. When the dominant power is weak or far away, 
the smaller powers will ally against it.24 The balancing and bandwagoning behavior 
evident through Afghanistan’s history illustrates the suitability of Migdal and Waltz’s 
                                                 
21 Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the 
Middle East,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Phillip S. Khoury and Joseph 
Kostiner. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), 68.  
22 Waltz, 113-4.  
23 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 
Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 4.  
24 Miriam Fendius Elman, “The Foreign Policies of Small States: Challenging Neorealism in its Own 
Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1995), 177.  
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approaches for explaining the behavior of qawm leaders in Afghanistan. Evaluating 
only the internal power distribution, however, provides an incomplete account of the 
motivations of local leaders in their interactions with the central government. Cultural 
and ideological norms, as well as the intra-tribal political dynamic also shape the 
behavior of societal groups.   
Conceptions of legitimacy can also influence the behavior of group leaders. 
There is often a tendency to view tribes as stable polities with unchanging hereditary 
leadership. This image does not reflect the realities of the tribal system in 
Afghanistan, where there exists a more fluid concept of internal leadership. In 
addition to competing against the state, tribal leaders are constantly evaluating their 
position within the group. Often, other influential figures, such as landlords and 
clerics, are competing with the tribal leader for the loyalty and resources of the group 
members. In this environment, the tribal leader’s external policies must support his 
internal legitimacy. As we will see in Chapter 4, the religious and tribal leadership’s 
opposition to the erosion of their social and economic authority under Amanullah led 
them to organize a rebellion under the pretext of protecting their traditional values. 
Similarly, the declaration of a jihad by the tribal elders of Nuristan in 1978 was an 
attempt to motivate their followers to take up arms to protect their political and 
economic interests in the name of religion.  
Salzman and Anderson have also dealt with the relationship between the 
internal politics of societal groups and their behavior towards the state.25 They have 
                                                 
25 Phillip Carl Salzman, “Tribal Chiefs and Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation in the Middle 
East,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 1974); and Jon W. Anderson, “There Are No 
Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Tribal Afghanistan,” Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1978).   
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argued separately that differences in tribal structure determine the level of 
mobilization capability and influence behavior within the system. Leaders of 
indigenously centralized tribes have greater capability to mobilize their group’s 
resources and population and can therefore adopt more active policies towards 
advancing the interests of the group. In contrast, leaders of traditionally decentralized 
groups experience greater difficulty raising revenue and influencing internal political 
decisions and are more constrained in their interactions with other groups.26  
The theoretical approaches described above provide us with the ability to 
identify individual case behavior as part of wider trends in Afghanistan’s political 
history. As we will see in the following chapters, the accumulation and devolution of 
state authority, subjugation of non-Pashtun groups, and power calculations of tribal 
leaders are best understood as instances of the theoretical approaches of Dupree, 
Barfield, Shahrani, Migdal, and Waltz.  
                                                 
26 Ibid, 204-5 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Foreign Invaders and Tribal Confederacies: 
Tribe-State Relations from Prehistory to the Nineteenth Century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Though the modern Afghan state did not begin to take shape until the late 
nineteenth century, the roots of contemporary state-society relations reach back to 
Afghanistan’s early history. The region’s first foreign conquests, carried out by 
Darius, Alexander, the Arabs, and Genghis Kahn illustrate patterns of governance and 
the historical saliency of qawm groups that are still evident today. Afghanistan’s 
present cultural and ethnic diversity has deep roots that are best understood through 
examining the Abbasid and Timurid periods. Similarly, contemporary political trends, 
specifically the political dominance of Durrani Pashtun tribes, are best understood in 
the context of the collapse of the Safavid Empire. By covering the period from 
Afghanistan’s prehistory to the late nineteenth century, this chapter provides the 
necessary historical background to explore the processes of state building that began 
in earnest under Abdur Rahman. 
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Afghanistan’s First Conquerors 
Archeological evidence, including some of the world’s first stone tools, 
suggests that Afghanistan was first inhabited during the Middle Paleolithic era 
(between 300,000 and 30,000 years ago).1 It was not until much later, however, in the 
seventh century BC, that the area began to gain regional strategic and economic 
importance. Zoroastrianism has its roots in the region, and historians believe that 
Zarathustra was killed near Balkh, in northern Afghanistan, in 522 BC.2 The spread of 
Zoroastrianism, which became the court religion of the Achaemenids in 556 BC, 
incorporated Afghanistan into the Persianate world.3  When Darius the Great (522-
486 BC) began consolidating control over Afghanistan, however, he encountered stiff 
resistance from “small tribal kingdoms,” whose “bitter fighting and constant revolts 
forced the Achaemenids to maintain strong garrisons” in the country, some of which 
evolved into towns which are still inhabited.4  
 Darius’s invasion is significant because it was the first time in recorded 
history that Afghanistan was invaded and ruled by a foreign power. Importantly, the 
episode demonstrates that tribal governance structures have played a central role in 
Afghanistan for at least the last 2,500 years. The political and military significance of 
qawm groups in Afghanistan would become even more apparent when a Macedonian 
upstart defeated Darius III in 331 BC and sought to expand his own empire in the 
east.  
                                                 
1 Although the term “Afghanistan” was not used until the 18th century, I have used the country’s 
modern name to refer to the various territories which would later become contemporary Afghanistan. 
Louis Dupree, Afghanistan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 260.  
2 After the Umayyad invasion, his tomb, located at Mazar-e Sharif, was converted into the “Shrine of 
Ali,” the cousin of the Prophet and fourth Caliph. George MacMunn, Afghanistan: From Darius to 
Amanullah. (London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1929), 9.   
3 Dupree, 273.  
4 Ibid, 274. 
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 Alexander the Great is perhaps the best known of Afghanistan’s early 
conquerors. As Afghanistan’s first invader from west of the Bosporus, Alexander’s 
conquest is also viewed by both Afghans and Westerners as the harbinger of “wave 
after wave” of foreign invasions of the country.5 To be sure, the attitude of 
Alexander’s eastern conquests bore some similarities to later foreign efforts to subdue 
Afghanistan’s tribes. Before leading his armies east from Persia in 330 BC, the 
twenty-six-year old monarch implored his troops of the need to pacify the empire’s 
barbarian threats, “It is by your arms alone that they are restrained…We are dealing 
with savage beasts, which lapse of time can only tame, when they are caught and 
caged, because their own nature cannot tame them.”6  
Though Alexander led his troops through the regions of present-day Herat, 
Qandahar, Balkh, and Kabul, his invasion has special cultural significance for both 
the Tajiks and Nuristanis. In 327 BC, as Alexander was campaigning to subdue to 
Sogdians, from whom many Tajiks claim descent, “many guerillas holed up in the 
heretofore impregnable Sogdian Rock” fortress.7 Surrounded by high cliffs, the 
fortress seemed an unassailable refuge for the Sogdians, who taunted Alexander to 
look for “winged soldiers.”8 Rising to the challenge, Alexander equipped a company 
of volunteers with ropes and tent stakes to climb the cliffs. When the Sogdians woke 
the next day to find the Macedonian’s “airborne” troops, they surrendered.  
Among the prisoners was Roxanne, the daughter of Oxyartes, a Bactrian 
leader from Balkh. Remembered by the Macedonians as “the most beautiful of all the 
Asiatic women they had seen,” Alexander fell in love with the girl, although he did 
                                                 
5 Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 24.   
6 Quintus Curtis Rufus, History of Alexander. Book 2, Vol. 6, trans. John C. Rolfe. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1946.), 25-29. 
7 Dupree, 281.  
8 A.R. Burn, Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Empire. (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 145.   
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not pursue her romantically. When Alexander continued his conquests to the Rock of 
the Chorienes, near present-day Faizabad, Tajikistan, Oxyartes, who had learned of 
Alexander’s interest in his daughter, acted as the Macedonian’s dragoman and 
negotiated for the surrender of the fortress. Shortly thereafter, Alexander and 
Roxanne were married in a part-Macedonian, part-Sogdian ceremony.  
Contemporary Tajik folklore holds Roxanne in high regard for her ability to 
reconcile East and West, and today, many Tajiks in Tajikistan and Afghanistan name 
their daughters after her. Though many Tajiks celebrate the romantic love between 
Alexander and his bride, Tarn, a scholar of Alexander, views the arrangement as “a 
marriage of policy, intended to reconcile the eastern barons and end the national war” 
by encouraging the Sogdians to bandwagon with the Macedonians.9  
In contrast, Alexander’s invasion of present-day Nuristan is widely viewed as 
the first of many failed attempts to conquer Afghanistan. After subduing the Sogdians 
in the north, Alexander turned south and followed the Kunar River towards India. The 
account of the Roman historian Curtis Rufus indicates that Alexander encountered, 
and conquered the “cultural forefathers of the Kafirs.”10 According to Rufus, “When 
[Alexander] thereafter had conquered an unknown people, he came to the city of 
Nysa,” where his men “set alight the trees; and the fire, thus nourished, attacked the 
burial places of the inhabitants. These ancient buildings, being made of cedar wood, 
easily caught fire and the fire spread to all sides.”11 After the local inhabitants 
surrendered, Alexander’s men became “gradually more and more frivolous, garlanded 
themselves with ivy and vines, and with the king’s approval abandoned themselves to 
                                                 
9 William Tarn, , Alexander the Great. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 76. 
10 Lennart Edelberg, “Nuristanske Sølvpokaler,” Kuml, Den jyske Arkæologiske Selskab (1965) 196 
11 Ibid, 194. 
 25 
feasting and wine.”12 Edelberg points to the mention of burial houses, cedar wood, 
ivy, vines, and wine drinking–all characteristics unique to the valleys of Nuristan–to 
conclude that Alexander definitely encountered the Kafiris’ forbearers.   
An interesting contrast is found between Curtis Rufus’s account and those of 
later historians of Afghanistan. Rufus does not pay special attention to the resistance 
of the Kafir tribes, but instead suggests a high level of fraternization between 
Alexander’s armies and the tribesmen (and, very likely, tribeswomen). However, later 
accounts paint Alexander’s eastern campaign as the origin of Afghanistan’s culture of 
armed resistance. Jones, for example begins his book, In the Graveyard of Empires, 
with this type of account of Alexander’s conquests of Afghanistan. Barfield recounts 
the popular version of Alexander’s campaign and relates it to contemporary military 
challenges:  
The difficulties that Alexander the Great faced in fighting the 
mountain tribes in the Kunar valley in the fourth century BC were 
not that much different from those faced by the Americans there in 
the twenty-first century, except that the former dropped boulders 
and the latter shot rockets from their mountain perches.13 
 
The Afghans (who later rewrote the story to replace the Kafiri tribesmen with 
Pashtuns) are equally quick to celebrate their “defeat” of the Macedonian.14  
 However, as Edelberg and Dupree point out, the Kafiris likely bandwagoned 
with Alexander as he pressed into India.15 Rather than the source of stiff resistance 
that Nuristan would become for the Soviets and Americans 2,300 years later, Kafiris 
became partially integrated into the Macedonian order of battle. Other components of 
                                                 
12 Ibid, 195. 
13 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 69.   
14 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2010), 108.  
15 Dupree, 283.  
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contemporary Nuristani folklore, such as attributing lighter skin and hair color to the 
genetic imprint of Alexander’s armies, indicate that the Nuristanis may not have 
resisted the Greeks as much as some would like to believe.16 
 
The Rise of Eastern Empires 
 Though Alexander succeeded in unifying the “savage” eastern tribes into one 
polity, his accomplishment was fleeting, and following Dupree’s model of fusion and 
fission, “local rebellions broke out in the Bactrian and Indian provinces almost 
immediately” after his death.17 The dissolution of the empire gave rise to the Graeco-
Bactrian kingdom, which ruled over Afghanistan until it was succeeded in the first 
century BC by the Kushan Empire, which “was especially significant in the cultural 
and political development of the country.”18 Afghanistan’s present multiculturalism 
reaches back to this period, when Hellenistic and Buddhist cultures mixed and gave 
rise to a new Graeco-Buddhist civilization. The Kushan period also saw the 
expansion of western trade with China, which brought Buddhism to the Han and 
enhanced the economic importance of Afghanistan as the center of the Silk Road.19 
 In the second century AD, Kushan power began to fade and the Sasanian 
Empire, centered in Persia, became the dominant imperial power in Afghanistan. The 
Sasanians did not hold Afghanistan for long before the Hephthalite Huns invaded 
from Central Asia and displaced them with “wholesale destruction” that “caused 
                                                 
16 Barfield, 29.   
17 Dupree, 283.   
18 Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
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major social dislocations in the country” around 450 AD.20 Undeterred, the Sasanians 
allied with the Western Turks defeated the Hephthalites around 565 AD. The Turks 
were given control of Hephthalite territory north of the Oxus River, while the 
Sasanians gained the territories to the south.21 The significance of this demarcation is 
evident today, as the Oxus River (now named the Amu Darya) has largely endured as 
Afghanistan’s northern border since.  
 
Islam Enters the Fold 
 In the seventh century, the Sasanians were defeated by the Umayyad 
Caliphate, who reached Afghanistan in 699. Despite the religious zeal that 
undergirded their conquests, the Umayyads recognized the intractability of tribal 
structures and pursued a “Swiss Cheese” strategy of governance by “permit[ting] 
local native rulers to retain their thrones,” albeit with the “assistance” of Arab 
military governors and administrators.22 While the pre-Islamic period in Afghanistan 
lacked “ethnic homogeneity, a unified economic and administrative system, religious 
unity, and political stability,” the Muslim invasion brought “a cosmopolitanism and 
lack of racial consciousness” that permitted greater political and cultural unity.23 One 
region that did not join in the cosmopolitanism was Kafiristan, which resisted foreign 
influence and conversion to Islam until the late nineteenth century.  
 When the Abbasid caliphate began to weaken around 850, local rulers began 
to proclaim their own dynasties, which swore fealty to Baghdad, but continued to 
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fight amongst themselves.24 This period, which lasted until the twelfth century, saw 
the expansion of Turkic control over Afghanistan and the eastern caliphate. The first 
of these Turkic empires, the Ghaznawids “militarized” the Afghan tribes for “their 
periodic incursions into India,” which has “contributed to the emergence of Afghan 
military feudalism” which continues to be a feature of Afghan political life.25  
 The rise of the Seljuk Turks in Afghanistan, which began around 1038, saw a 
similar devolution of central authority to feudal and regional power holders, in line 
with Barfield’s Swiss Cheese model.26 When the Ghurid Empire rose in the middle of 
the twelfth century, decentralized power had become the norm in Afghanistan. The 
Ghurids, which, unlike Afghanistan’s previous rulers, were based in Afghanistan, 
depended on “tribal military power” for their campaigns in India.27 The Ghurids co-
opted tribal leaders with land tracts and booty from across the Hindu Kush that 
“enabled Afghans to perpetuate and strengthen their feudal society” which persists to 
this day.28  
 
Mongol and Timurid Invasion and Safavid Rule 
 Genghis Khan’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1220 has been compared to an 
“atom bomb,” the affects of which are still visible.29 The violence and destruction of 
the Mongol conquest is evident in both the ruins of lost cities, such as Shahr-i 
Gholghola near Bamiyan, and in the apocalyptic role that Genghis Khan plays in 
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contemporary folklore. Notably, while the Panjsher Valley was devastated by the 
invasion, the Kafiris largely avoided capitulating to the Mongols.30 
 Though many point to Genghis Khan as one of Afghanistan’s failed invaders, 
the historical evidence suggests that he pacified and effectively governed 
Afghanistan.31 Like Afghanistan’s recent conquerors, Genghis Khan imposed a 
centralized regime that did not allow for variance or deviation. However, unlike 
recent rulers, Genghis Khan possessed a monopoly of force that allowed him 
implement such an American Cheese approach. For example, he razed entire cities in 
order “to reshape the flow of trade across Eurasia” to “routes that his army could 
more easily supervise and control.”32 The lasting, but unpalatable, significance of his 
rule is that it demonstrates the degree of violence and destructiveness necessary to 
govern Afghanistan in a manner that is not reflective of its political culture or social 
history.   
 After the death of Genghis Khan, his empire dissolved and local power 
holders again emerged as the dominant form of governance. A century and a half 
later, Tamerlane, a Turkic ruler from Samarqand, conquered Afghanistan. As brutal 
and destructive as Genghis Khan, Tamerlane fused together an empire that included 
much of Central Asia and the Iranian plateau. Like his predecessors, however, when 
he attempted to conquer the Kafirs, he was “stung for his pains.”33 His dynasty lasted 
until the mid-sixteenth century, when his descendant, Babur, was driven into India by 
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the Uzbek Shaybanids. There, he founded the Moghul Dynasty, which continued to 
project into eastern Afghanistan and came into conflict with the eastern tribes.34  
 The decline of the Timurids coincided with the rise of the Shi’a Safavid 
Empire in Persia. It was during this period of Safavid rule that conditions that would 
continue to shape Afghanistan’s political culture began to emerge. The intensification 
of the Sunni-Shi’a divide, as well as the discovery of maritime routes between Europe 
and Asia, isolated Afghanistan from the wider Muslim world. Additionally, the 
expansion of Safavid power also contributed to Afghanistan’s political division. 
While Uzbeks controlled the north and the Moghuls dominated the east, the Safavids 
took the south and west. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these 
three empires continually came into contact in the area between Kabul and 
Qandahar.35 Not coincidentally, during the same period, “tribalism continued to 
prevail” in Afghanistan, and “at least 345 separate named tribal units,” including the 
Kafiris, remained largely independent.36 
 
Rise of the Pashtun Tribes 
 The astute reader will have noticed the absence of the most politically 
significant qawm group in contemporary Afghanistan from the first two millennia of 
Afghan history. Though it does not fit with the myth of Pashtun supremacy over 
Afghanistan, Pashtuns did not play a role in national politics until the mid-eighteenth 
century.37 Indeed, their appearance as the dominant tribes of the south and east only 
dates back to the division of Afghanistan between the Moghul, Uzbek, and Safavid 
                                                 
34 “Wine and Tulips in Kabul,” The Economist, December 16, 2010.   
35 Dupree, 321.  
36 Muhammad Abdur Rahim, The History of Afghans in India: AD 1545–1631. Karachi: Pakistan 
Publishing House, 1961), 34-5.   
37 Barfield, “Problems Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” 268.  
 31 
empires in the sixteenth century.38 Not surprisingly, each empire adopted a different 
approach to dealing with its “tribal problem.” Confronted with stiff resistance from 
eastern Pashtun tribesmen, the Moghuls were compelled to regularly undertake costly 
military expeditions and pay local leaders to guarantee Moghul sovereignty in the 
tribal areas. These policies resulted in the development of “a strong sense of Pashtun 
consciousness, which became increasingly manifest through the emergent Pashto 
poetic and literary tradition” and resistance to Moghul rule.39  
 Because of their attempts to impose Shi’ism on the population, the Safavids 
were met with much fiercer resistance than the Moghuls. Shahrani characterizes how 
the Persians maintained their rule through internal colonialism:  
The Safavids recruited local fighting men into the Persian armies, then 
stationed them in Persia, banished individuals, transplanted entire 
kinship groups in distant areas, and relied on a policy of divide and 
rule, creating conflicts between local leaders.40  
 
One of the groups relocated by the Safavids was the entire Abdali clan, who were 
moved from Qandahar to western Afghanistan in order to break the power of Pashtun 
tribes in the south.41 In addition to empowering the Ghilzai Pashtuns, this strategy 
also encouraged the development of aristocratic clans within the different Pashtun 
tribes. One of these clans, the Hotaki of the Ghilzai, would make the first attempt at 
establishing an Afghan state at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  
  The rise of the Pashtuns as national political players began in 1703, when the 
Safavid ruler, Shah Sultan Husain I sent a Georgian mercenary to Qandahar to put 
down a Baluch rebellion in the region. A local Hotaki Ghilzai leader, Mir Wais Khan, 
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chaffed under the rule of the new Governor-General and led a failed rebellion against 
the Safavids. The Georgian exiled Mir Wais to the Safavid capital of Isfahan, where 
“through judicious flattery and subtle bribes” he was able to gain the favor of the 
Shah’s court.42 In Isfahan, Mir Wais observed the weakening of the Safavid dynasty 
and calculated his return to power. He received permission to make the Hajj 
pilgrimage to Mecca, where he was able to obtain a fatwa calling for the Sunni 
overthrow of the Shi’a Safavids. In 1709, Mir Wais returned to Qandahar armed with 
both the fatwa and the good graces of the Shah and successfully revolted against the 
Safavids. Four months later, Mir Wais’s Ghilzais defeated the Safavids, along with 
their Abdali allies. 
 The political power of the Ghilzais continued to grow when Mir Mahmud, the 
son of Mir Wais, invaded Persia in 1719. Although he was met with resistance from 
the 42,000 strong Persian army (which included twenty-four cannon under the 
command of a French officer, Philippe Colombe), Mir Mahmud pressed on and, in 
1722, captured the Safavid capital of Isfahan. Ghilzai rule over Persia would be short-
lived, however, and by 1736, Nadir Shah Afshar, a Turk from Khorasan, expelled the 
Afghans. With the help of the Abdali Pashtuns, he expanded the Persian Empire 
across Afghanistan, unifying the country’s northern, eastern, and western regions for 
the first time in modern history. In 1739, he sacked Delhi before taking his campaign 
into Central Asia. His successes, however, led him to become “so fiercely tyrannical 
that the inevitable end came in 1747, when he was assassinated by Salah Beg, the 
captain of his guard.”43 Predictably, Nadir Shah’s empire fractured after his murder, 
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and his former Abdali Pashtun allies emerged as the dominant political force in of the 
newly unified Afghanistan.44 
The Durrani Empire 
 In the aftermath of Nadir Shah’s assassination, Ahmad Khan Abdali, the 
king’s treasurer during his Indian and Central Asian campaigns, seized a great part of 
royal treasury (including the famed Koh-i Noor diamond, which is currently set in 
Queen Elizabeth’s crown) and, with 10,000 Abdali horsemen, marched to 
Qandahar.45 There, the Abdali tribal leadership convened a jirga, or council, where, 
after nine days, they selected Ahmad Khan as their military leader.46 Contrary to 
some historical accounts, Ahmad Khan was not selected to become King of 
Afghanistan, but was chosen by the Abdali leadership because “he was a member of 
the comparatively weak Sadozai clan of the Popalzai subtribe” that the “chieftains 
presumably believed they could remove from power if he did not act in their 
interests.”47 Perhaps sensing this intrigue, Ahmad Khan initially resisted the jirga’s 
decision until Sabir Khan, a local holy man, placed some wheat in Ahmad Khan’s 
turban and declared him “Shah, Pearl of Pearls” (Badshah, Durr-i Durran). The 
sobriquet stuck and Ahmad Khan’s dynasty and the Abdali tribes have since been 
called Durrani.48  
 The selection of Ahmad Shah Durrani demonstrates that, from the outset, the 
Afghan state has been in conflict with tribal leaders who have resisted surrendering 
their privileged positions to the monarchy. Additionally, the selection of a monarch 
whose rule was contingent on the good will of the Durrani leadership ensured that 
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“the monarch’s first task was to satisfy the interests of his own clansmen” before 
those of the state.49 Ahmad Shah achieved this by distributing landholdings and 
important state offices to leaders of the various Durrani subtribes. In contrast, “non-
Durrani tribes received an insignificant amount of land,” but paid most of the taxes 
and provided the most soldiers.50 This tribalization of the central government, largely 
expressed through the distribution of offices in accordance with qawm interests, has 
since endured as a defining characteristic of Afghan politics.  
 After securing his role as the leader of the Durrani, Ahmad Shah then turned 
to expanding his control over Afghanistan. While some historians incorrectly refer to 
his rule as the origin of the modern Afghan state, his governance more closely 
approximated that of his imperial predecessors. Indeed, the chief difference between 
Nadir Shah and Ahmad Khan was that the latter was Afghan. Capitalizing on the 
power vacuum created by Nadir Shah, and making full use of the former emperor’s 
treasure and cavalry, Ahmad Shah defeated the Ghilzai and expanded his empire to 
include Kabul, Peshawar, the Punjab, Herat, and Mashhad. However, as the empire 
grew, the power of Ahmad Shah was continually checked by the “tribal-feudal 
socioeconomic framework,” which required the consent of the Durrani tribal 
chieftains to enact important policies.51 Ahmad Shah’s empire similarly did not 
penetrate the non-Pashtun qawm groups, who were ruled indirectly “through their 
own local leaders.”52 In this way, the Durrani Empire was closer to “mechanism by 
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which the Pashtun tribes under [Ahmad Shah’s] command ruled over other 
territories,” than a centralized state.53  
 Despite these limitations, Ahmad Shah adopted several policies that were 
intended to centralize the rule of the monarchy. He attempted to strengthen ties with 
various tribes by taking wives for himself and his sons from them. He also struck his 
own coins and attempted to create a standing army, which was designed to decrease 
the dependency of the monarchy on tribal levies.54 His foreign conquests increased 
the legitimacy of the monarchy among the tribes and created a sense of national unity. 
In spite of these efforts, Ahmad Shah ultimately failed to establish a strong 
centralized monarchy or curb the political influence of tribal leaders. Gregorian 
summarizes the Durrani monarch’s dilemma:  
To maintain his rule and consolidate the position of the monarchy 
he was dependent on the important Afghan tribes; at the same time, 
the country’s long-term interests called for a centralized monarchy 
on the Persian model, one that would not only be independent of 
the tribes, but assert its authority over them.55  
 
Every ruler since Ahmad Shah has struggled to balance these two imperatives against 
what Dupree described as the life-cycle of fusion and fission in Afghanistan. 
 In 1772, Ahmad Shah died from natural causes (“maggots developed [in the 
upper part of the nose] and they dropped into his mouth when he ate or drank”) and 
was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah.56 The second Durrani monarch largely 
continued his father’s policies and also chafed under the power of the tribal leaders. 
In 1775, he moved the capital from Qandahar to Kabul, which was populated mostly 
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by Tajiks, in order to lessen the role of the Pashtun tribal leaders in national politics.57 
However, like his father, Timur Shah was unable to weaken the political power of the 
Durrani tribes. After his death in 1793, his father’s empire seemed as if it was about 
to unravel. With no law of royal succession, the different tribes represented in the 
shah’s harem maneuvered for their kinsmen to become the new king. After a period 
of court intrigue, Zaman Shah emerged with the support of the powerful Barakzai 
clan.58  
 Like his predecessors, the new king tried to centralize authority and challenge 
the tribal chiefs, eventually leading to the end of the alliance between the monarchy 
and the Barakzai clan. Struggling to maintain the authority of the monarchy, Zaman 
Shah allied with the Ghilzais and launched an invasion of India. In 1800, he executed 
several tribal chiefs, including the head of the Mohammadzai tribe (part of the 
Barakzai clan). In response, Fateh Khan, the son of the Mohammadzai chief, joined 
with Shah Mahmud, the king’s brother and rival, and imprisoned, blinded, and 
deposed Zaman Shah. The frequency and violence of these inter-tribal rivalries 
ensured that Afghanistan “entered the nineteenth century a politically disunited, 
ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, tribal feudal state.”59  
 
Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century 
 As the Durrani Empire began disintegrating in the late eighteenth century, 
internal divisions and foreign interference began to become indelible features of 
Afghan politics. With the support of the Barakzai tribal leaders, Shah Mahmud 
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ascended the throne in 1800, until his brother, Shah Shuja, seized power in 1803. 
Shah Shuja ruled until 1809, when the Barakzai leaders, led by Fateh Khan restored 
Shah Mahmud. Shah Mahmud maintained power until 1818 when the Barakzai 
leaders again overthrew him and ended the Sadozai dynasty, this time in retaliation 
for his blinding and dismembering of Fateh Khan.60 
 While the Durrani clans scrambled for control of their crumbling federation, 
Ranjit Singh, Zaman Shah’s former Governor of Punjab declared independence and 
established the Sikh Empire. Deprived of their Indian territories, the Sadozai rulers 
lost the access to the wealth “with which they had cemented their tribal coalitions.”61 
Afghanistan became further divided by tribal warfare. Rubin points out that this trend 
recurs throughout Afghan history: the loss of outside revenue leads to the decline of 
state control and the devolution of power to regional centers. The most recent 
example of this is the overthrow of Najibullah in 1992, after the collapse of his 
patron, the Soviet Union, discussed further in Chapter 5.62 However, the loss of 
tribute from India was soon replaced with a different kind of support from the new 
imperial power across the Hindu Kush.  
 
Enter the British Empire 
 Tribal infighting continued to fracture Afghanistan throughout the early 
1820s. During this period, the Mohammadzai clan emerged as the dominant political 
force, with the brothers of Fateh Khan controlling the different regions of 
Afghanistan. By 1826, Dost Muhammad, who controlled Ghazni and Kabul, was 
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recognized by the family as the monarch.63 Over the next nine years, Dost 
Muhammad capitalized on his position and expanded the power of the monarchy by 
“curtailing the power of the other Durrani subtribes” while concentrating political and 
administrative control in the hands of his Barakzai kinsmen.64 At the same time, he 
expanded monarchy’s control over Kohistan, including the Panjsher Valley, which 
had hitherto resisted inclusion in the Durrani state.65 In 1835, these campaigns, 
coupled with “his judicious use of the institution of marriage to advance his political 
designs” proved fruitful and Dost Muhammad was crowned the Emir of 
Afghanistan.66 
 As European powers drew closer to Afghanistan, Dost Muhammad was the 
first ruler to look to the West for technological and military support. In 1836, he 
asked the British Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, for assistance to retake 
Peshawar from the Sikhs. In response, the British dispatched Alexander (later 
“Bukhara”) Burns to Kabul to investigate possible trade routes and work towards a 
rapprochement between the Afghans and the Sikhs.67 While no British military 
support was forthcoming, Dost Muhammad retained several Persian, French, 
American, and English adventurers as military advisers.68 Though mostly 
opportunistic soldiers of fortune, these advisers exposed the Emir to Western military 
technologies and organizations that he used to modernize and strengthen parts of his 
army. Despite some modest reforms, Dost Muhammad’s military efforts largely failed 
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outside of Kabul, where the military remained “feudal-tribal” in character.69  
 Dost Muhammad also began Afghanistan’s first modern efforts to centralize 
political authority in Kabul. He deposed or executed unruly tribal chiefs, including  
Panjsheri leaders, and launched a campaign to conquer the Hazara. To give his 
military aims religious legitimacy, he declared a jihad against the Sikhs in Peshawar 
and adopted the title, Emir al-Muminin, or Commander of the Faithful. In the capital, 
he brought the judicial system into the royal court, thereby limiting the power of the 
religious establishment. He improved tax collection and duties on foreign trade. The 
Emir also established relations with the non-Durrani border tribes, who he sought to 
incorporate into the national defense structure. Despite Dost Muhammad’s best 
efforts, however, these reforms were largely sporadic and restricted to Kabul. The 
loss of revenue from India was still limiting the monarchy’s ability to forge tribal 
alliances or project power.  
 In order to recover the sources of revenue necessary to continue his 
consolidation of power, Dost Muhammad looked to the British for support in 
recovering Peshawar from Ranjit Singh. The British, however, refused to support the 
Afghans against their Sikh ally and instead offered to mediate negotiations between 
the two parties. British policy in India sought to maintain a balance of power in the 
region, with Afghanistan powerful enough to resist the Russian-backed Persians, but 
not strong enough to challenge Sikh control of the Punjab.70 In 1837, this policy 
failed when the Persians, with significant Russian support, attempted to enforce their 
claim to Herat and laid siege to the city. Faced with the prospect of Russian 
                                                 
69 Gregorian, 77.  
70 Ibid, 97.  
 41 
expansion towards India, the British responded by dispatching a fleet to attack the 
Persian Gulf coast.71  
 The siege of Herat convinced the British of the need for a friendly monarch in 
Kabul who would act as a buffer for Russian expansion while accepting Sikh control 
over the Punjab. Dost Muhammad, who had “showed a neutral preference for the 
British” and still pushed for Afghan control of Peshawar did not suit Britain’s 
imperial designs for the region. Fortunately for Lord Auckland, the deposed Sadozai 
monarch, Shah Shuja, who was in exile in India, was more than willing to accept 
British support for his return to power.  
 In April 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan, ostensibly to support the 
efforts of Shah Shuja’s (non-existent) army to remove the “anti-British” Dost 
Muhammad and restore the throne to the Sadozai dynasty. The details of the conflict 
are outside the scope of this thesis, but it suffices to say that the First Anglo-Afghan 
War was not the last time that a foreign army would invade Afghanistan without 
sufficient numbers to control the country in order to support a weak leader without 
clear objectives for victory. The invasion galvanized a national resistance against the 
British troops, all but one of which were slaughtered as they retreated to India. By the 
end of the conflict in 1842, Dost Muhammad, who initially fled to Bukhara, was 
restored to the throne until his death in 1863. 
 
State Disintegration and the Second Anglo-Afghan War 
 Following the death of Dost Muhammad, the monarchy’s control over the 
country weakened and “internal dissention and anarchy prevailed in Afghanistan,” in 
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line with Dupree’s model of state fission.72 His son Sher Ali, ascended to the crown, 
but he lacked the resources necessary to expand state control. The advance of British 
India into the Punjab foreclosed the possibility of unifying the tribes with the promise 
of the “fruits of conquest.”73 Instead, the Afghan monarch was left to either play 
groups against each other or to seek aid from an outside power. While the British 
were forthcoming with some aid, it was not enough to ensure the monarchy’s control 
over the increasingly independent qawm groups. For this reason, during this period: 
Tribalism reemerged as a potent force that weakened the state in its 
battle with the khans for social control…the balance of power between 
state and tribes…repeatedly shifted, often because of changes in the 
relations between the state and the international system.74 
 
Such a shift occurred in the 1870s, when, under new Conservative leadership in 
London, the British began to adopt a more forward policy towards confronting Russia 
in the “Great Game” for Eurasia.  
 As the British began projecting their influence into Afghanistan in the 1840s, 
the Russians pursued a similar course in Central Asia; and by 1874, Russia occupied 
much of the territory north of the Amu Darya (present-day Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan). The Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and the plan to extend Russia’s railway 
network into Central Asia heightened tensions with Britain, who viewed Tsarist 
expansion as a threat to India. Britain challenged Russia’s southern activities by 
moving an army to Quetta and petitioning Sher Ali to accept a permanent British 
mission in Kabul.75 Worried that the Russians would expect similar influence in 
Kabul, the king ignored the British requests. When the Russians dispatched a mission 
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to Afghanistan (without the approval of Sher Ali) in 1878, the British again 
demanded that he accept British representation, and sent Neville Chamberlain to 
Kabul to lead the mission. When the expedition was denied permission to proceed to 
Kabul, the British fumed over the “glaring national insult” inflicted by the Afghan 
monarch.76 One month later, the British again invaded Afghanistan.  
Despite their quick victory in deposing Sher Ali, the British did not seek to 
rule Afghanistan directly.77 Instead, they sought to establish a strong buffer state that 
could resist Tsarist advances without the assistance of British troops. For this task, the 
British found a willing partner in Sher Ali’s nephew, Abdul Rahman Khan, who 
General Roberts, the commanding general of the British forces in Kabul at the time 
called, “our most suitable instrument” for governing Afghanistan in accordance with 
British interests.78 In 1881, a year after the Liberals gained control of the 
Government, Britain withdrew its forces from Afghanistan and left Abdur Rahman 
Khan as the emir of their new client state.  
 
Towards a Modern State 
 Abdur Rahman’s reign would see Afghanistan’s first attempt to create a 
modern centralized state in the European mold. These efforts, despite employing the 
trappings of modern statehood–from automatic weapons to a centralized civil 
service–and the support of the British Empire, would ultimately fail. Several trends 
throughout Afghanistan’s history leading up to Abdur Rahman’s rule illustrate 
enduring sources of resistance to state centralization in Afghan political culture.  
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First, the dominance of local governance structures in Afghanistan has been 
recognized since at least 500 BC, when Darius encountered resistance from “small 
tribal kingdoms” in his eastern campaign. These qawm and tribe-based units resisted 
incorporation by every successive foreign invader. Ruling Afghanistan, as Alexander, 
the Umayyads, and the Safavids demonstrated, required incorporating and then co-
opting these tribal structures into the larger state framework.  
Afghan rulers since the mid-eighteenth century have contributed to the 
saliency of local governance structures by pursuing internal colonialist policies that 
tribalize the state apparatus. The distribution of state sanction and benefits in 
accordance with qawm-based interests has impeded the growth of a modern state. As 
institutions were tribalized from the onset, the character of the Afghan government 
has continued to resemble a tribal confederation more than a national state.  
Finally, the militarization of the border tribes under the Ghaznawids began a 
tradition of Afghan leaders relying on foreign conquests, usually in India, to generate 
sufficient revenues to cement their tribal federations. This pattern was repeated by 
rulers until the expansion of the British Empire prevented further Afghan incursions. 
With insufficient command over domestic resources, Afghan monarchs since Dost 
Muhammad have been unable to maintain control of the country without significant 
foreign support.  
As Afghanistan attempted to build a modern state in the late nineteenth 
century, these trends continued to inhibit state formation.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
“A beautiful monument without a foundation”: 
State Building in Afghanistan from 1880 to 1978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the byline “Record stores, Mad Men furniture, and pencil skirts–when 
Kabul had rock ‘n’ roll, not rockets,” Foreign Policy magazine recently published a 
collection of photographs from Afghanistan during the 1950s and 1960s. With images 
of girl scouts, lab technicians, and hydroelectric dams, the essay portrayed an 
Afghanistan that, only fifty years before, seemed to be on the cusp of modernity. 
According to the article:  
Afghan women pursued careers in medicine; men and women 
mingled casually at movie theaters and university campuses in 
Kabul; factories in the suburbs churned out textiles and other 
goods. There was a tradition of law and order, and a government 
capable of undertaking large national infrastructure projects, like 
building hydropower stations and roads, albeit with outside help. 
Ordinary people had a sense of hope, a belief that education could 
open opportunities for all, a conviction that a bright future lay 
ahead.1 
 
While the Foreign Policy essay correctly points out that Afghanistan’s urban society 
and economy had donned the trappings of modernity, its nostalgia for Afghanistan’s 
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mid-twentieth century milieu ignores that the state structure of the time remained a 
relic of the qawm politics of the nineteenth century. The Afghan government 
modernized its military, education system, and infrastructure, but did not engage in a 
political strategy that aimed at replacing tribal governance structures. By the 1970s, 
the government was not equipped to respond to political crises that were provoked by 
the country’s growing politically conscious elite. The result has been almost four 
decades of state collapse and foreign occupation. To understand how Afghanistan 
entered the twenty-first century a failed state, we must first explore how the idealized 
Afghanistan of “Mad Men furniture and pencil skirts” came to be.  
 
Laying the Foundation of a Modern State 
The roots of the current Afghan political system reach back to the Second 
Anglo-Afghan War and the rise of Abdur Rahman at the end of the nineteenth 
century. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the 1878 British invasion of 
Afghanistan was largely the result of the Conservative British government’s forward 
policy towards confronting Russia in Central Asia. After defeating Sher Ali, the 
British initially set out to follow the Swiss Cheese approach by governing the parts of 
Afghanistan most important to the defense of India while leaving the rest of the 
country to local rulers.2 However, when the Liberals took control in London in 1880, 
the British government began pursing a more restrained strategy in the region. Rather 
than dividing the country and ruling parts of it directly, the British supported the 
candidacy of Abdur Rahman to the throne on the condition that he accept British 
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control of Afghan foreign policy.3 Abdur Rahman had recently returned from exile in 
Samarqand and was fighting a civil war against his cousin, Muhammad Ayub, for 
control of the country. With his political future uncertain, he accepted the British 
conditions and the emirship. 
Abdur Rahman would prove to be one of the most significant figures in 
Afghan political history. Like many of his predecessors, he inherited a country that, 
through civil war, weak leadership, and foreign invasion, had fallen back onto feudal 
patterns of governance.4 In his biography, the “Iron Emir” later described the political 
atmosphere when he assumed the throne, “Every priest, mullah, and chief of every 
tribe considered himself an independent King, and for about 200 years past, the 
freedom and independence of many of these priests were never broken by their 
sovereigns.”5 Undeterred by this persistent fission, Abdur Rahman embarked on a 
series of military campaigns and administrative reforms designed to weaken the 
power of local rulers and move Afghanistan towards becoming a modern state.  
After defeating his cousin and consolidating his control of the monarchy, 
Abdur Rahman began a campaign of “breaking down the feudal and tribal system and 
substituting one grand community under one law and one rule” that would 
characterize his reign.6 Between 1881 and 1896, Abdur Rahman launched seventeen 
internal military campaigns, the result of which was usually the “wholesale 
executions and deportations” of the defeated groups.7 While previous monarchs 
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depended on persuasion and shifting alliances to consolidate state power, Abdur 
Rahman expanded his control through “force, bloody reprisals, matrimonial alliances, 
bribes, and intrigues.”8 With a political style closer to Genghis Khan than Sher Ali, 
Abdur Rahman relied on a monopoly of violence to implement a political program 
that did not allow for local variance or deviation.  
The Iron Emir’s tactics were as brutal and discriminatory as they were 
successful. He relied on internal colonialist policies, notably the ethnic cleansing of 
non-Pashtun communities, such as the Hazara and the Kafiris and the forcible 
relocation his Ghilzai Pashtun rivals to the north, where their collocation with Tajiks 
and Uzbeks ensured their primary identification would be ethnic and not tribal.9 In 
Turkestan, Panjsher, Herat and the Ghilzai areas, Abdur Rahman “destroyed 
countless local communities by decimating their leadership through executions, 
confiscation of properties, exile or imprisonment in the capital.”10 The Emir 
repopulated these severely weakened communities with Pashtuns, whom he felt were 
the only ones who could “be relied on in the borderlands.”11 With British artillery and 
rifles, Abdur Rahman was able to project the military power to promote a centralized 
Afghan state unlike any of his predecessors.12   
Abdur Rahman’s project of centralizing political power was implemented 
administratively, economically, culturally, and militarily. Much like Stalin would do 
in Central Asia forty years later, the Emir redrew provincial and sub-provincial 
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boundaries to divide tribes, making “different segments of a tribe answerable to 
different provincial governments.”13 He also developed a Kabul-centered civil 
administration which endured, albeit in a modified form, until the Soviet invasion in 
1979.14 Abdur Rahman formed a loose constitutional government, with a Supreme 
Council and a General Assembly, both advisory bodies with no authority, but which 
served as precursors to a cabinet and legislature.15  
The Iron Emir also attempted to weaken the power of local leaders through 
modernizing and centralizing the Afghan economy. He replaced regional currencies 
with a single monetary unit, regularized tax collection, and invested in light industry 
(including weaponry).16 He expanded road networks and modernized the postal 
system to integrate isolated markets with Kabul. He also largely normalized trade 
with his neighbors, even as relations with India, Central Asia, and Persia became 
increasingly sensitive to Great Game rivalries. Despite these reforms, however, 
Abdur Rahman was wary of the encroaching foreign powers and enacted policies to 
isolate Afghanistan economically. He blocked attempts to integrate his country into 
Russian and British rail and telegraph networks and forbade foreign investment.17 His 
decision may have been strategically correct, but it retarded Afghanistan’s economic 
development and long-term stability.   
As part of his reform program, the Iron Emir also brought the powerful 
religious establishment under his control by requiring judges to pass state 
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examinations and nationalizing the religious waqf endowments.18 He further 
weakened the political role of the clerics by claiming the sole authority to interpret 
Islamic laws and issue religious edicts. 19 With the new title, “Defender and 
Champion of the Islamic Faith in Afghanistan,” Abdur Rahman used Islam as another 
means of expanding his political authority, especially in areas controlled by non-
Sunni groups, such as the Hazara and the Kafiris.  
 By 1895, Abdur Rahman had succeeded in incorporating all of the territory of 
modern Afghanistan, except one. Straddling the Hind Kush with access to Laghman, 
Jalalabad, and Panjsher, Kafiristan posed a threat to Abdur Rahman’s Afghanistan. 
With the Russians advancing into the Pamir and the British tightening control east of 
the Hindu Kush, the Iron Emir feared that Kafiristan would eventually fall into the 
British or Russian orbit.20 In order to prevent the Kafiris from obtaining external 
assistance, the Emir waited until winter, when the passes were closed by snow, and 
launched his attack on the valleys of Kafiristan. He dispatched armies to Kunar, 
Panjsher, and Badakhshan to attack Kafiristan from the north, west, and south. 
Although the Kafiris were known as fierce fighters, they still relied on primitive 
weapons, such as bows and arrows, and were hopelessly outgunned by the British-
armed Afghan army. Within forty days, Abdur Rahman conquered the Kafiris. 
Displaying the same type of bandwagoning behavior that led their ancestors to join 
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Alexander’s army, the Kafiris converted to Islam and many joined the Afghan army.21 
In 1906, the area was renamed “Nuristan,” or “Land of Light.”  
 Abdur Rahman’s victory in Kafiristan, and indeed his consolidation of 
independent qawm groups throughout Afghanistan, was facilitated by his 
modernization of the military, which Gregorian calls his “single greatest 
achievement.”22 Though leaders since Dost Muhammad had attempted to modernize 
the Afghan army, the force which Abdur Rahman inherited was distinctly “tribal and 
feudal in character.”23 Because it relied on qawm-based levies, the monarchy was 
never able wrest military control away from local leaders. To weaken the power of 
these leaders, Abdur Rahman instituted the hashtnafari system, wherein each qawm 
group sent one in every eight men to the Emir’s army. Unlike his predecessors, Abdur 
Rahman succeeded in creating a standing army with salaried and uniformed soldiers 
and an officer corps. The Afghan army, however, was still a long way from achieving 
Prussian efficiency. Concerned over British influence, Abdur Rahman did not accept 
foreign advisers or promote military exchanges. As a result, his military lacked the 
technical training necessary to become fully independent of tribal levies.  
   
The Enduring Legacy of Abdur Rahman 
 Though the Iron Emir’s reforms seem modest by contemporary standards, his 
policies have had a lasting impact Afghanistan’s political culture. In expanding the 
power of the monarchy, Abdur Rahman established some of Afghanistan’s first 
government institutions. His military, civil service, judiciary, cabinet, and tax code 
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would become the foundation of Afghanistan’s “golden age” in the mid-twentieth 
century. Some of the Iron Emir’s policies, however, hindered long-term state 
building. His economic isolation partially preserved Afghanistan’s independence, but 
it did not bring development or stability to his country.  
 Abdur Rahman’s most enduring legacy, however, is the flawed model of 
centralized governance which has persisted since his death in 1901. As Barfield 
points out, because Abdur Rahman’s form of governance “went against the grain of 
[the] Afghan tradition” of strong local governance structures, most of his 
achievements were short-lived.24 While he enjoyed political and military successes, 
Abdur Rahman’s state-dominated centralization empowered of the very local leaders 
that he was trying to undermine. As Shahrani explained in Chapter 2, the state’s 
policies of internal colonialism aimed at undermining the identity and autonomy of 
political rivals led non-Durrani groups to develop “community-based parallel power 
structures” that endured and challenged the supremacy of the state into the next 
century.25  
 
Habibullah: A Less-Than-Iron Emir 
 After the death of Abdur Rahman, the throne passed to his son, Habibullah. 
Like his father, the new emir sought to modernize Afghanistan and strengthen the 
power of the central government. The methods Habibullah used to enact his policies, 
however, differed greatly from those of Abdur Rahman. Rather than implementing 
his will by force, Habibullah attempted to gain the support of tribal and religious 
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leaders by loosening some of his father’s more oppressive policies. He offered 
amnesty to political prisoners and exiles, curtailed the monarchy’s control of the 
clerics, abolished his father’s domestic spy network, eased compulsory military 
service, and tried to promote generally positive relations between the state and local 
qawm leaders.26 These reforms, initially undertaken from a position of strength for the 
monarchy, contributed to the gradual erosion of state authority that occurred 
throughout Habibullah’s reign. 
 As Habibullah reoriented the state’s approach to qawm authority, he also 
sought to modernize his country. His greatest influence in this regard was Mahmud 
Tarzi, who had spent most of Abdur Rahman’s reign in exile in Ottoman Turkey. 
Tarzi was among a group of prominent exiled families, including the future 
Musahiban kings, who “brought new ideas, both secular and religious,” to 
Afghanistan after the death of Abdur Rahman.27 Observing the rise of the Young 
Turks in the Ottoman Empire, Tarzi returned to Afghanistan convinced that a 
socioeconomic transformation of his country was necessary to “reinforce the 
authority and power of the monarch, contribute to the stability of the country, and 
stave off external threats.”28 Habibullah agreed and adopted the “Young Afghan” 
approach of wedding Islam, nationalism, modernization, and secularism to the 
promotion of the Afghan state.  
 Tarzi became a key adviser in Habibullah’s government and encouraged the 
monarch to implement several reforms that he believed would modernize 
Afghanistan. He established the country’s first newspaper, which published both 
                                                 
26 Gregorian, 181.  
27 Barfield, 175.   
28 Gregorian, 164. 
 54 
domestic and foreign news, in order to inform the long-xenophobic Afghans of the 
“intellectual, scientific, and technological achievements” of Europe and the West.29 
Tarzi translated European literature–especially Jules Verne, who he hoped would 
generate interest in science–and Turkish works on international law and the Russo-
Japanese War into Persian. He also published articles that cut against deep traditions 
by advocating for women’s rights and the modernization of the Afghan economy. 
Under Habibullah, Afghanistan’s industrial workers rose from 1,500 to 5,000, 
although industrial growth was still “slow and difficult.” 30 
  One of Tarzi’s most enduring contributions to Afghan political culture was 
the introduction of European-style nationalism into Afghanistan’s education and 
political discourse. He promoted the status of Pashto, which he regarded as the “true 
national language,” instead of Persian, which had long been the official government 
language.31  Like Abdur Rahman, Habibullah and Tarzi promoted an Islamic 
nationalism. Tarzi relied on well-established Sunni jurisprudence to argue that, since 
Afghanistan was an Islamic kingdom, service to the nation (watan) was a religious 
obligation. Modernization, which allowed the king to better protect the country’s 
sovereignty, was not only accepted, it was a religious requirement. 
 Many religious and qawm leaders rejected this reasoning and resented 
government intrusions into Afghan society, especially efforts that weakened their 
internal legitimacy by encouraging the secularization of education and promotion of 
women’s rights. Abdur Rahman probably would have overcome these objections by 
killing those who voiced opposition. Habibullah, however, had retreated from his 
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father’s heavy-handed policies, and was unable to implement his modernization 
programs outside of the capital. While “the legacy of Abdur Rahman was still strong 
enough” to forestall popular revolts, by the second decade of the twentieth century, 
political power in Afghanistan still did not center on the government in Kabul.32 
When Habibullah was murdered by an unknown assassin on a hunting trip in 
Jalalabad 1919, he left behind a country that was just beginning to modernize 
elements of its economy and society. The core of Afghanistan’s political system, in 
contrast, was just as diffuse and qawm-centric as it had ever been.  
 
Amanullah and the Trappings of Modernity 
 The death of Habibullah was followed by a brief power struggle between 
conservative and reformists forces within the elite. Habibullah’s brother, Nasrullah 
Khan rallied the support of the religious and tribal leaders and declared himself the 
new Emir while still in Jalalabad. However, the centralizing reforms of his 
predecessors had shifted some key components of state power to Kabul, where 
Habibullah’s son, Amanullah, was acting as vice-regent in his father’s absence. 
Controlling the Kabul garrison, arsenal and treasury, Amanullah was able to push 
aside his uncle and secure the throne. Intra-Durrani qawm politics also played a key 
role in the ascendance of Amanullah, whose mother, Ulya Hazrat, rallied her 
powerful Barakzai clan to support her son.33  
 As the father-in-law of the new Emir, Tarzi and his Young Afghan movement 
had long been an influence on Amanullah. Shortly after becoming king, Amanullah 
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challenged Afghanistan’s status as a British protectorate and appointed Tarzi foreign 
minister. In April 1919, he declared a war of independence against Britain, which 
rallied his conservative and tribal opponents to jihad.34 Though the Third Anglo-
Afghan war lasted only two months and was a military disaster for the Afghans, the 
British, who were recovering from the First World War, conceded their control over 
Afghanistan’s foreign policy.  
Amanullah’s victory over the British enhanced his prestige with his 
conservative critics and enabled him begin a period of ambitious educational, 
administrative, and social reforms. The Emir first focused on education, which he 
hoped would “cultivate an enlightened intellectual class in Afghanistan…and provide 
a group of able administrators for the monarchy.”35 Under Amanullah and Tarzi, the 
government began recruiting foreign teachers, established German and French 
schools in Kabul, sent promising students abroad for university education, and 
introduced “modern” subjects–math and geography–into traditional school curricula 
throughout the country.36 In 1921, the government even began building public 
schools for girls and sending female students abroad to continue their education. 
Amanullah’s desire to improve the status of women in Afghanistan was not restricted 
to his education policies. During his reign, Afghanistan outlawed child marriages, 
extended greater legal rights to women, and encouraged women to abandon the veil, 
which he felt “hid half of the Afghan nation.”37  
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Amanullah also expanded his father’s administrative reforms. He codified 
Afghanistan’s criminal laws, continued to centralize the judiciary, introduced a 
process for clemencies, banned torture by the police, abolished slavery, and extended 
government protection over private property.38 The government under Amanullah 
also introduced a new tax law and Afghanistan’s first national budget.39 The most 
important of Amanullah’s administrative reforms, was the introduction of 
Afghanistan’s first constitution in 1923. While it institutionalized the hereditary 
absolute monarchy, it also increased the consultative role of qawm leaders in the 
government. Two advisory councils, the Durbar Shahi and the Khawanin Mulki, were 
established to represent the Durrani tribal leaders and khans and maliks of other 
groups. Membership in the Durrani “upper house” was hereditary, while half the 
members of the “lower house” were elected and half were appointed by the Emir.40  
Amanullah’s reform program incensed rural religious and tribal leaders, 
whose livelihoods depended on their continued role at the center of Afghan social and 
political life. The religious establishment feared an erosion of their societal role and 
opposed his education policies on the grounds that they challenged the primacy of the 
Qur’anic schools and replaced clerics with secular teachers. From the beginning, the 
religious establishment was suspicious of Amanullah’s desire to emulate Ataturk’s 
Turkey and Reza Shah’s Iran. After the abolition of the caliphate and the 
consolidation of Soviet control over Central Asia, Afghan clerics began to see the 
walls closing in on them.41  
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In 1924, for the first time in over thirty years, the centralizing and 
modernizing policies of the government sparked an armed revolt. Centered the Khost, 
the rebellion was led by the eastern Pashtun Mangal tribe, which had long resisted 
foreign interference.42 While they cloaked their motivations in religious terms, the 
rebels were chiefly concerned with the penetration of state authority–manifested in 
taxation, conscription, and new family laws–into their lives.43 The rebellion, which 
lasted for nine months, exposed the weakness of the central government, which had 
neglected the military to fund its other reform projects. This military ineffectiveness 
forced Amanullah to seek an alliance with conservative religious and tribal leaders, 
who conditioned their assistance on the annulment of some of the monarch’s social 
reforms. The government’s acquiescence to competing sources of power would have 
been unimaginable under Abdur Rahman. Though the Khost Rebellion is only a blip 
on the radar of Afghan history, it demonstrated the weakness of the monarchy relative 
to local leaders and “punctured the aura of military invincibility that the Afghan state 
had nurtured for two generations.”44 
Between 1924 and 1928, Amanullah was forced to slow down his reforms. In 
late 1928, however, after returning from an eight-month tour of Europe and the 
Middle East–unprecedented for an Afghan king–Amanullah’s modernizing zeal was 
rekindled. After observing the technologically advanced European militaries and 
economies, and the modernization of secular Turkey and Westernized Iran, the Emir 
returned to Kabul determined to bring his country into the modern era. He proposed 
replacing the two consultative chambers, “which had long represented the interests of 
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the feudal lords and the powerful Afghan tribes,” with an elected parliament.45 He 
upgraded the military’s weaponry and proposed to make military service compulsory. 
While these policies were begrudgingly accepted, the Emir’s social reforms, 
including raising the marriage age to eighteen, providing Western education to girls, 
forbidding the asylum of clerics from Soviet Central Asia, and restricting clerical 
revenues and endowments led “the priesthood to go wholeheartedly against him.”46  
Opposition to Amanullah’s reforms also grew among other groups. The higher 
taxes needed to fund government development projects had alienated the urban and 
peasant classes, the religious establishment, and the tribal leaders.47 The Afghan state 
was not viable without the support of these elements of society. In November 1928, 
when another tribal uprising occurred among the Shinwari, the army became bogged 
down and the government’s tribal levies deserted. As the internal balance of power 
shifted and the government appeared weak, groups that had previously bandwagoned 
with the Durrani monarchy abandoned their alliance. Habibullah Kalakani, a Tajik 
bandit from Kohistan, took advantage of the power vacuum and attacked and briefly 
occupied sections of Kabul. With the monarchy in jeopardy, Amanullah compromised 
with his opponents and nullified many of his previous social and administrative 
reforms. The scope of the repeal of Amanullah’s reforms was staggering: 
The Afghan girls studying Constantinople were to be recalled, and 
the schools for girls in Afghanistan were to be closed; the ulama of 
Deoband [a center of conservative thought] were to be allowed free 
access to and the right of residence in Afghanistan; women were 
not to go unveiled or cut their hair; the mullahs were no longer to 
be required to obtain teaching certificates; compulsory military 
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recruitment was to be abandoned and the old tribal system 
reinstalled; mutasibs were to be appointed for each province to 
ensure that religious precepts were observed. The Amir also 
cancelled his order making it mandatory (after March 31, 1929) for 
all Kabulis and visitors from outlaying areas to wear Western 
dress, including hats…48 
 
These concessions were not enough and, on January 14, 1929, when Kalakani again 
attacked Kabul, Amanullah abdicated the throne to his brother, Inayatullah. After 
Kalakani had captured the city three days later, Inyatullah also fled and Kalakani 
proclaimed himself Afghanistan’s first non-Pashtun Emir.  
 If Amanullah had stayed in power and garnered enough political support to 
continue his reforms, there is a strong chance that Afghanistan would have developed 
into a country that would be unrecognizable today. Instead, the enduring legacy of his 
rule is the illustration of the weakness of the central government relative to qawm 
groups. Fifty years after the Iron Emir began centralizing Afghanistan by force, 
political authority had returned to the “priests, mullahs, and chiefs” that Abdur 
Rahman had excoriated when he assumed the throne. This reversal illustrates the 
saliency and intractability of qawms in Afghan politics. While Abdur Rahman 
succeeded in enforcing the supremacy of the monarchy over local leaders, he did not 
transform Afghanistan into a unitary state. Rather, he bequeathed to his successors a 
tribal country that possessed merely the trappings of a modern state. Amanullah failed 
because his attempted cultural, economic, administrative, and social reforms were not 
supported by sufficient political or military authority. As Mahumd Tazi put it, 
“Amanullah has built a beautiful monument without a foundation. Take out one brick 
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and it will tumble down.”49 The lesson of 1880-1929 is that Afghanistan can only be 
governed in a manner alien to its political history by an “Iron Emir.” A leader who 
lacked the capability or will to govern with force sufficient to suppress qawm rivals 
would be better adopting a “hands off” approach. Afghanistan’s next rulers, the 
Musahiban dynasty, understood this lesson well.  
 
The Rise of the Musahiban 
 Habibullah Kalakani’s reign lasted only nine months before he was 
overthrown by Mohammad Nadir Khan in October 1929. A descendant of both the 
Mohammadzai and Sadozai Durrani lineages and the third cousin of Amanullah, 
Nadir Khan had served as Afghanistan’s commander-in-chief until he was exiled (as 
ambassador to France) for his opposition to the tempo of Amanullah’s modernization 
programs. Nadir Khan believed that the Emir’s tribal opposition should be mollified 
through intra-tribal jirgas and appeasement, rather than through force.50 After the fall 
of Amanullah, Nadir Khan and his brothers, collectively known as the Musahiban, 
gathered an army of Mangal, Jaji, Jadran, Ahmadzai, and Tota Khel Waziri Pashtun 
tribes and launched a series of assaults on Kabul from India.51 By October 1929, 
Nadir Khan had dislodged Habibullah Kalakani from the capital and convened a jirga 
to validate his accession to the throne. Recognizing his ascension as a tribus ex  
machina, Nadir Shah relied heavily “on the cooperation of the religious establishment  
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and the [Pashtun] tribes” to consolidate the monarchy’s control over Afghanistan.52  
 Even as he made concessions to conservative groups, Nadir Shah moved 
ahead slowly with modernization programs.53 He re-opened secondary schools in 
Kabul and sought to expand elementary education throughout the country. 
Newspapers began publishing, commercial air travel was introduced, and telephone 
and telegraph lines were expanded. Nadir Shah also established a national bank and 
enacted policies that encouraged private investment in trade and the industrial 
economy, which had previously been dominated by the government. These policies, 
however, were superficial and did not affect the bulk of Afghan society. The rural 
economy remained overwhelmingly feudal and women were still barred from 
education. For Nadir Shah, modernization was “not more important than preserving 
the internal stability of Afghanistan.”54  
 Even after Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933, stability remained the chief 
imperative of the Musahiban brothers, who supported the accession of the king’s 
nineteen-year old son, Zahir Shah. Political power, however, rested with the young 
monarch’s uncles, who alternatingly served as regents for the next twenty years. 
While Afghanistan under Amanullah had been with Turkey and Iran at the forefront 
of modernization in the Islamic world, under the Musahiban brothers, modernization 
in Afghanistan was limited by bargains the monarchy had struck with qawm leaders 
to consolidate their political position.55 As a result, attempts by the government to 
expand state authority were more tempered than under previous rulers.  
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 Muhammad Hashim, Nadir’s brother who served as prime minister from 1933 
to 1946, sought to enhance the position of the central government by promoting 
Afghan nationalism and modern education. Like Mahmud Tarzi and the Young 
Afghans, the new nationalists sought to establish a common history that was rooted in 
the imagined linguistic, ethnic, and religious unity of various the peoples of 
Afghanistan. Ignoring the heterogeneous history described in the previous chapter, 
the government promoted a “softer” form of internal colonialism by promulgating 
ideologies that denied the role of non-Pashtuns in Afghan history. The government, 
for example, promoted the theory that that Afghans were descendants of the ancient 
Aryans and that the Bactrian kingdom was actually Pashtun. These historians, who 
were well-received by their “Aryan cousins” in Berlin, sought to prove that Pashtuns 
“demonstrated state-building qualities long ago, and that modern Afghanistan is the 
product of a continuous historical process, not simply a ‘political accident.”56  
 The government also elevated the status of Pashto, which although widely 
spoken, was not the dominant language. Linguistic theories began circulating that 
Pashtu was actually the source language of Persian. Beginning in 1937, the Ministry 
of Education rewrote curricula to include mandatory Pashto instruction, which was 
problematic since Pashto was not traditionally a written language. The success of 
these Pashtun-centric nationalist policies was limited. Inventing a history and 
changing the official language was not an adequate substitute for institution-building 
or political reform.  
 In spite of the revival of nationalist rhetoric, the Musahiban approach towards 
modernization remained subdued. Rather than enact national programs, as Amanullah 
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had done, the Musahiban rulers introduced programs quietly in Kabul before 
expanding them throughout the country.57 While this strategy minimized qawm-based 
opposition to the monarchy, it also contributed to the increasing bifurcation of 
Afghan society between the urban elite and rural population. This became evident 
when Afghanistan first experimented with parliamentary democracy.  
 By the 1940s, the government’s investment in foreign education had produced 
a growing class of liberally educated and politically conscious elite. Shah Mahmud, 
who had succeeded his brother as prime minister in 1946, was encouraged by this 
development and opened the political system to parliamentary elections that were 
relatively fairer than previous votes. In 1949, this opening resulted in the election of 
the “Liberal Parliament,” which consisted of between forty and fifty (out of 120) 
reformist members.58 This bloc, unlike previous legislators, attempted to exert 
oversight of the government ministries. They also succeeded in passing a law 
establishing the freedom of the press, which led to a flowering of newspapers critical 
of the government. Inspired by the new liberalism, Kabul University students formed 
a student union and met to debate contemporary social issues. Some students even 
performed plays that satirized the royal family and Islam.  
  These liberal openings were short lived window dressings for a political 
system that still belonged to the previous century. In the run-up to the 1952 
parliamentary election, the government began closing down newspapers and arresting 
opposition leaders. The facility with which the government put down the liberal 
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opposition illustrated the discontinuity between elite civil society and the real centers 
of political power–the conservative qawm forces that buttressed the monarchy.  
 
Daoud’s Great Leap Forward 
  Shah Mahmud’s initial support of the “Liberal Parliament” had harmed his 
credibility with the royal family and the Musahiban leadership, who feared that 
liberalization was a prelude to instability. In 1953, these groups overthrew the prime 
minister in a bloodless coup and appointed General Muhammad Daoud Khan, a 
cousin of King Zahir Shah and the Commander of the Central Forces in Kabul, in his 
place.59 Barfield characterizes the relationship between Zahir and Daoud as 
tarburwali, which “connotes something along the lines of ‘cousin competition’ and is 
used to describe the endemic gamesmanship, rivalry, and sometimes open hostility 
that is thought to exist inevitably between the sons of brothers.”60 Indeed, the rivalry 
between Zahir Shah and Daoud would define Afghan politics for the next twenty 
years.  
  Rather than focusing on opening the political system, Daoud concentrated his 
pursued policies aimed at modernizing the Afghan military, economy, and education 
system. A generation earlier, Amanullah attempted to pay for his similarly ambitious 
reforms by imposing land and livestock taxes that contributed to his unpopularity 
among the rural population. Wishing to avoid a similar fate, Daoud financed his 
reform projects by turning to a strategy which reached back to the Ghaznawid period–
extracting money from foreigners. With the Cold War in full-swing, Daoud found 
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willing patrons for his development projects and military assistance programs in the 
United States and the Soviet Union. This strategy proved so fruitful, that, by the 
1970s, direct taxation comprised less than one percent of government revenue.61  
 During Daoud’s term as prime minister, the American government financed 
coal exploration in Pul-i Khumri, irrigation projects in the Helmand Valley, and the 
construction of Qandahar International Airport.62 American aid to Afghanistan, 
however, was limited by the Afghan government’s unwillingness to sign a mutual 
security agreement with the United States and normalize relations with Pakistan, 
America’s main ally in South Asia. Daoud instead turned to the Soviets, whose aid 
projects dwarfed the American programs. Among the most ambitious of the Soviet 
projects was the construction of the ring road linking Kabul with Herat via Qandahar, 
the exploration of natural gas near Sheberghan, and the construction of the Salang 
Pass Tunnel, which connected Kabul to the north of the country and was the highest 
tunnel in the world at the time it was finished.   
 Although Afghanistan officially pursued a neutral (bi-tarafi, literally without 
sides) foreign policy under Daoud, his government became increasingly Soviet-
oriented. When the US government refused several requests for military assistance in 
1953-55, Afghanistan purchased $25 million worth of T34 tanks, MiG 17s, Ilyushin-
28 jet bombers, helicopters, and small arms from the Warsaw Pact.63 These purchases 
significantly increased the capability of the Afghan government to project force 
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internally.64 However, as foreign aid comprised an increasing percentage of 
government expenditures–forty percent from 1958 to 1968–Afghanistan became a 
rentier state. 
 By 1959, the government was secure enough in its position to begin 
implementing social reforms, the most radical of which was the voluntary unveiling 
of women. Unlike Amanullah, who pursued a broad platform of social policies that 
were designed to change Afghan life, Daoud’s reforms were aimed at the urban elite 
and largely did not take hold outside of the capital.65 Contemporary observers gushed 
at the veneer of modernization that took hold in the capital. “Today it is impossible to 
go into a government office or many private offices in Afghanistan without seeing 
women behind typewriters, or, in rare cases, actually working in administrative 
positions,” wrote Dupree in 1973.66 Such attitudes evolved into the type of “Pencil 
skirts and Mad Men furniture” nostalgia for Daoud’s rule illustrated in the 
introduction to this chapter.  
 Nostalgia aside, Daoud’s government still relied on qawm politics for 
legitimacy outside of Kabul. The government pursued a policy of gradual 
encapsulation, rather than confrontation, by directing foreign aid through the Ministry 
of Tribes to reward loyal qawm leaders. Salzman explains that such government 
subsidies decrease the tribal leaders’ dependence on the support of their fellow 
tribesmen and created a rift between the leadership and the tribe.67 Tribal structures 
endured, however, because, despite the modernization of state institutions, the 
                                                 
64 Rubin, 65.  
65 Barfield, 202.  
66 Dupree, 533.  
67 Phillip Carl Salzman, “Tribal Chiefs and Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation in the Middle 
East,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 1974). 
 68 
government was limited in its ability to compete with tribal leaders in providing 
services (security, education, employment, etc.) directly to the people. As a result, 
qawm-based parallel power structures remained an inhibition to the rural penetration 
of state authority. 68 
 Barfield’s observations from his fieldwork in Imam Sahib in the mid-1970s 
describe the relationship between the state and parallel qawm structures:  
Despite its pervasive presence in the town and easy proximity to the 
valley’s villages, the Afghan government seemed remote to the local 
residents. There was no organic connection between them and the 
government-appointed officials. The enforcement of decisions below 
this point depended ultimately on the threat of force because the 
tribesmen and peasants rarely volunteered their cooperation…Common 
practice was for government officials to deal with villagers by means of 
local intermediaries.69  
 
The political relationship between the government and the local qawm groups that 
Barfield observed illustrates the gap between state and society in Afghanistan which 
endured through both Daoud and Zahir Shah’s modernization programs and political 
reforms.   
 
Flirtation with Constitutional Monarchy 
 In 1963, after bringing Afghanistan into a deadlocked border dispute with 
Pakistan, Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud was forced to resign. King Zahir Shah 
promised to open the political system and appointed an interim government to draft a 
new liberalized constitution.70 The next year, the king convened a Loya Jirga (which 
Rubin calls “probably the freest and most effective such body ever convened by the 
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state”) to ratify his government’s changes.71 However, rather than quickly adopt the 
king’s proposals, the members of the constitutional jirga engaged in serious debate 
and even rewrote sections of the document. After eleven days of deliberations, on 
September 20, 1964, the delegates submitted the new constitution to the King.  
 The Constitution of 1964 was a landmark political development in 
Afghanistan. Supporters of the reforms hoped that that the constitution would usher in 
an era of “New Democracy” for Afghanistan. Indeed, the Constitution increased the 
representative nature of the Afghan government by establishing a bicameral 
parliament, provincial councils, and limiting the power of the monarchy by 
preventing members of the royal family from serving in parliament, as prime 
minister, or on the Supreme Court. Even forty years later, when Afghans again 
adopted a new constitution after the fall of the Taliban, the 1964 Constitution was 
considered an ideal type of Afghan democracy and sections of it were copied 
wholesale.72 
 In spite of these aspirations, the Constitution of 1964 failed to transform the 
political landscape for several reasons, all of which continue to plague the state-
society relations in Afghanistan. First, while the Constitution provided a parliament, 
the government prohibited the establishment of political parties. As a result, the 
legislative branch remained weak and power rested with the executive and his 
immediate family members. In other states during the same period, political parties 
served as a conduit for tribal leaders to develop national networks and become further 
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encapsulated by the central government.73 This did not occur in Afghanistan. Second, 
the reforms illustrated the growing separation between the urban elite, who were 
enthusiastic about democratization, and the remaining “ninety-five percent non-
literate Afghans living in villages and nomadic camps [who] knew little and cared 
less about the new Constitution and ‘New Democracy.”74 Finally, as with previous 
efforts to “modernize” Afghanistan’s political system, the new Constitution failed to 
take hold because it attempted to implement a system of centralized governance that 
was anathema to the patterns of diffuse political authority that characterize Afghan 
political culture and history. Declaring that “the administration of Afghanistan is 
based upon the principles of centralization,” the Constitution failed to incorporate 
local qawm-based governance structures into the national system.75 Barfield’s 
observations above, made ten years after the promulgation of the new Constitution, 
illustrate the persistent failure of centralized regimes to penetrate competing local 
centers of political authority.  
 
Setting the Stage for State Collapse 
 King Zahir’s flirtation with parliamentary democracy ended in 1973, when 
Daoud overthrew the monarchy and established the Republic of Afghanistan. Unlike 
the tarburwali coups of the nineteenth century, Daoud did not use a tribal army, but 
instead relied on leftist activists and “a group of Soviet-trained military officers” to 
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seize power.76 After declaring himself Afghanistan’s first president, Daoud abolished 
the monarchy and nullified the 1964 Constitution. Communist and Islamists parties, 
which had operated underground during Zahir’s “New Democracy,” suddenly became 
significant players in national politics. Within the Communist People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), two factions emerged; the Khalq (Masses), which was 
comprised largely of Ghilzai Pashtuns, and the Parcham (Banner), which drew from 
the bureaucracy and universities. 77 In response to the growth of leftist student groups, 
Islamist students formed the Muslim Youth Organization, which drew inspiration 
from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and translated the writings of Sayyid Qutb 
into Persian. Several members at the core of this organization–Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar–later 
played major roles in the anti-Soviet resistance and Civil War.78  
 While the government initially attempted the limit the growth of the Islamist 
groups and the PDPA, by 1978 these antagonistic factions defined Afghan political 
life.  When a Parcham-affiliated police officer was assassinated in early 1978, the 
PDPA charged that Daoud (under the influence of SAVAK and the CIA) ordered the 
killing and led massive demonstrations in Kabul. The government responded to the 
unrest by arresting PDPA leadership. In response to the crackdown, several officers 
of the Soviet-trained and equipped military who were sympathetic to the PDPA 
launched a coup on April 27, 1978.79 Daoud was killed and power was transferred to 
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a military council headed by Nur Muhammad Taraki, “a politburo member 
responsible for Parcham’s military network.”80 After over 150 years of almost 
uninterrupted rule, the Mohammadzai dynasty ended.  
 No single policy or event was responsible for the thirty years of state collapse 
and civil war that followed Afghanistan’s “golden age.” Rather, the fragility of the 
Afghan state was a product of several trends which continue to plague Afghan 
politics. Successive Afghan leaders pursued policies aimed at centralizing state 
authority, but no ruler after Abdur Rahman possessed sufficient military force or 
political strength to implement his program. As a result, two Afghan societies 
developed: the urban, educated governing elite and the pastoral villagers, tribesmen 
and nomads. The increasing elitism of national politics divorced the majority of 
Afghan society from the state’s governing institutions and led to the reification of 
qawm-based governance structures. In the words of Mahmud Tarzi, Afghan rulers 
had “built a beautiful monument without a foundation. Take out one brick and it will 
tumble down.” 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Invasion, Civil War, and Extremism: 
The Collapse of Central Power in Afghanistan from 1978 to 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afghanistan’s most recent period of internal conflict and state collapse has its 
roots in the 1978 Saur Revolution. Although the communist PDPA espoused 
revolutionary ideologies, they pursued policies similar to their monarchical 
predecessors. Like Abdur Rahman, Amanullah, and Daoud, the Khalq Republic (as it 
became known when it purged its Parcham faction) targeted ethnic minority groups, 
pushed for gender equality, and attempted to restrict clerical power while promoting 
secular nationalism and strong economic and military ties with the Soviet Union. 
However, unlike successful Afghan leaders, the Khalq government attempted to 
implement its new policies by discarding the traditionally consensual relationship 
between the state and the various qawms. Previous monarchs had maintained the 
legitimacy and sovereignty of the state over non-Durrani groups by permitting the 
authority of local leaders, especially in social and religious matters. While some 
efforts had been made under Amanullah and Daoud to transform the rural society, the 
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scope of these reforms was limited by the monarchy’s imperative to maintain 
stability. With the expansion of state institutions and the modernization of the 
military during the 1950s and 1960s, the revolutionaries in Kabul believed that 
political power had irreversibly shifted from the qawms to the center.1 Ignoring the 
persistence of parallel qawm power structures, the Khalq Republic under Taraki 
adopted a heavy-handed approach to qawm groups that consequently delegitimized 
the central government and ushered in over three decades of state failure.2  
 
Unrest in Nuristan 
 The Khalq government’s antagonistic policy towards traditional leadership 
structures provoked its first serious backlash in Nuristan. Before the Saur Revolution, 
the Nuristanis had enjoyed a privileged relationship with the ruling Mohammadzais, 
who trusted the Nuristanis because of their distance from intra-Pashtun rivalries. 
During the 1947 Safi Pashtun revolt, for example, the government relied on Nuristani 
tribal levies to defeat the Safi rebels. When Daoud established the Republic of 
Afghanistan in 1973, he named Qadeer Nuristani his Interior Minister, the highest 
national post held by a Nuristani. Qadeer was later killed with Daoud during the Saur 
Revolution.3  
Shortly after the PDPA seized power, however, the government detained 
around three hundred Nuristani military officers, civil servants, and intellectuals in 
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Kabul.4 The arrests were explained to their kinsmen as a temporary precaution to 
avoid a counter-coup while the new government consolidated power. However, as the 
detentions lingered into July 1978, many believed that the Khalq government was 
attempting to exclude Nuristanis from their previously privileged political position.5 
After the district governor in Kamdesh prevented soldiers at his garrison from 
attending evening prayers during Ramadan, many Nuristanis began to feel that the 
new government was also intending to restrict Islam. Believing their political role and 
religious practices under pressure from the government, leaders from Bashgal, Wama, 
Parun, and Waygal Valleys met in Nangalam and convened a jirga that declared a 
jihad against the central government.6  
The first rebellion against the communist regime began on July 20, 1978, 
when around two hundred men “armés de cinq cents vieux fusils (beaucoup datant de 
plus d’un siècle), de pistolets et de frondes (redoutables dans le mains des bergers)” 
attacked the Manogay district governor’s compound, which was defended by 400 
government soldiers.7 After three days of fighting, the post fell to the rebels. Around 
the same time villagers in Kamdesh also revolted against the government, cutting the 
telephone lines and capturing the district governor. In response, the Khalq regime 
bombed several rebel villages and dispatched a force from Jalalabad to put down the 
revolt. The military response did not prove effective, and by October 1978, the Khalq 
government was effectively expelled from Nuristan. In November, the government 
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organized a counteroffensive with the Nuristanis’ tribal rivals, the Gujars, Mishwanis, 
Gawars, and Pashtuns from Shinwar. Reaching back to a strategy first employed by 
the twelfth century Ghaznawids, the government militarized the border tribes with the 
promise of loot from the defeated Nuristanis. The combined regular and tribal forces 
broke through the rebel defenses and pushed up the Bashgal Valley past Kamdesh to 
Mandagal.8 The irregular forces burned Nuristani villages and looted most of the 
livestock and the stores of the previous harvest. The Nuristanis regrouped, and in 
January 1979, a group of Parun montagnards trekked through the snow to launch an 
attack against the government troops at Mirdesh.9 After the commander of the pro-
government tribal levies was killed in the attack, the Gujars quit the field and the 
Shinwaris began negotiations with the Nuristanis. Deprived of their tribal allies, the 
military was forced back to Barikot, a town which remained the limit of the 
government’s advance towards Nuristan for the next decade.10 Just over eighty years 
after Abdur Rahman conquered Kafiristan, the changing balance of region led local 
leaders to break with the central government.  
 
Social Transformation and the Mujahedeen 
Elsewhere in Afghanistan, the government’s new policies were provoking 
similar resistance. In a speech in November 1978, Taraki announced the abolition of 
the brideprice in Afghanistan. While seemingly progressive, the reform undercut the 
economic and political role of marriage in rural society. Tapper explains:  
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The heaviest expenses any household has to bear are concerned 
with marriage. In other words, production is directed largely 
toward reproduction – toward acquiring wives who will produce 
sons who will produce labor and political support in defense of 
productive and reproductive resources, especially land and 
women.11  
 
Families who had counted on the brideprice of their daughters suddenly found their 
“investments” devalued by an average ninety-nine percent.12 In addition to drawing 
the ire of rural families, many religious leaders viewed the policy as an assault on 
traditional Islam. As during Amanullah’s reforms, these perceptions pressured 
societal leaders to reevaluate their stances towards the central government in order to 
maintain their internal legitimacy.  
In the same speech that he announced the brideprice reforms, Taraki also 
declared his government’s intention to launch a series of land reforms that proved to 
be particularly destabilizing for rural society. The program aimed to distribute 3 
million acres of farmland seized from large landowners to around 300,000 poor 
farming families.13 The effects of the redistribution were felt across the country, as 
approximately ninety percent of the population was engaged in agriculture or herd-
based economic activity.14 As many of the expropriated landowners were also qawm 
chiefs, the severance of the economic bond between master and serf weakened the 
role of the qawm leaders.15 Many landowners who objected to the new policy were 
kidnapped and executed, leaving their communities without social or political 
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leadership.16 Salzman explains that leaderless tribal groups are generally more 
difficult for external forces to subdue because power is diffuse.17 In Afghanistan, the 
dominant external power traditionally interacts with a qawm through an intermediary, 
called a malik, qaryadar, or arbab, who is chosen by the group. This figure is not 
necessarily the group leader or a large landowner, but this is often the case. When the 
Khalq government removed a group’s intermediary, either by force or by eroding his 
socio-economic ties with his qawm, it also eliminated the only established form of 
interaction between the state and most of the rural population.  
With the internal legitimacy of traditional economic-based leadership 
weakened, younger, more radical and more militant leaders emerged among 
Afghanistan’s rural communities. Many of these new kamandan, or commanders, 
were educated in Kabul during the 1960s and early 1970s, a time of “increasingly 
raucous” confrontation between leftist and Islamist student groups.18 After the Saur 
Revolution, several of the Islamist students, influenced by their exposure to political 
and militant Islamic philosophies from the Arab world, returned to their provinces 
and began fomenting opposition to the Khalq Regime. One of those students was a 
young Islamic-minded Tajik from the Panjsher Valley who would go on to become 
one of Afghanistan’s most celebrated and notorious mujahedeen commanders.  
 
The Rise of Ahmad Shah Massoud 
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 The son of an army officer, Ahmad Shah Massoud was born in Bazarak in the 
Panjsher Valley in 1953. He attended the French-sponsored Lycée Esteqlal and Kabul 
Polytechnic University, where he joined the Muslim Youth Organization. Under the 
tutelage of future mujahedeen commanders Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf and Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, Massoud was exposed to the writings of Sayid Qutb, which Rabbani had 
translated into Dari.19 After the Daoud coup, Rabbani encouraged members of the 
Muslim Youth Organization to begin actively opposing the new government. In 1974, 
Daoud cracked down on the group and Massoud, Rabbani, future mujahedeen 
commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and about 5,000 other students fled into Pakistan. 
The Pakistani ISI welcomed the group and began providing them with military 
training.20  
In 1975, the ISI infiltrated the group back to Afghanistan with the aim of 
again revolting against Daoud. In what became known as the Panjsher Valley 
incident, thirty-six Islamists under Massoud’s command seized one district and two 
subdistrict compounds. Before the revolt, Massoud sought, but did not receive, the 
support of the qawm leaders. Within twenty-four hours, the students were forced to 
retreat and Massoud again fled into Pakistan.21 The failed revolt demonstrated to 
Massoud the importance of qawm leadership.22 After returning to Pakistan, tensions 
between Rabbani’s Jamaat-i Islami and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami led to a split 
between the organizations. Massoud stuck with Rabbani’s mostly Tajik faction while 
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Hekmatyar’s Hezb, which was mostly comprised of eastern Pashtuns, went on to 
become the ISI’s main Afghan clients.23  
In 1978, Ahmad Shah Massoud returned to the Panjsher with the aim of 
continuing his insurrection against the Khalq regime. Unlike in 1975, the land and 
marriage reforms, which were brutally enforced by the military and state security, had 
delegitimized the regime and contributed to popular discontent in the valley. In July 
1979, after forces loyal to Ismail Khan mutinied in Herat, Massoud led a rebellion 
against the Khalq government in Panjsher and Salang. While he was eventually 
defeated, he established his credibility as the preeminent kamanda in the Panjsher 
Valley. As the Islamist and qawm-based opponents of the communist regime 
continued to grow across the country, Massoud prepared his forces to join a national 
resistance against the regime.   
 
Enter the Soviet Union 
 On Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and ignited three 
decades of internecine conflict and state collapse. According to declassified KGB and 
Politburo records, the decision to invade was taken after Taraki was overthrown by 
rival PDPA leader Hafizullah Amin in September 1979. Moscow feared that Amin, 
who had studied at Columbia University, was in league with the CIA to reverse the 
progress of communism in Afghanistan.24 Beginning in early December 1979, the 
Soviets began quietly increasing the number of advisers and KGB officers in the 
country. Babrak Karmal, an exiled member of the Parcham faction of the PDPA, was 
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selected to replace Amin and secretly flown to the Soviet airbase in Bagram. On 
December 24, as Soviet paratroopers captured Kabul International Airport and tanks 
from the 40th Army crossed the Amu Darya on pontoon bridges, KGB paramilitary 
officers disguised in Afghan army uniform attacked the Presidential Palace and killed 
Amin. By the next morning, Karmal was installed as Afghanistan’s new president.25  
 Despite the growing unrest outside of Kabul, the resistance did not pose a 
serious threat to the new regime.26 Rather, the Soviet’s largest challenge was 
reconstructing state institutions that had been dismantled by the Khalq government, 
who, in their post-revolutionary zeal had “disposed of the institutions in favor of 
generalized violence.”27 The Soviet’s state building, however, was hampered by the 
persistence of the Parcham-Khalq rivalry.28 The conflict paralyzed the PDPA and left 
the Soviets with the final decisions on policy, a development which contributed to the 
delegitimizing perception that the Soviets were controlling the government.  
  
The Erosion of Traditional Leadership in Nuristan 
Beginning in the spring of 1980, the Soviet Union expanded its military 
presence to over 100,000 troops as it sought to crush the local rebellions that were 
metastasizing into a national revolt. In Nuristan, the increase in Soviet pressure 
contributed to the empowerment of the mujahedeen commanders at the expense of 
traditional leaders, such as Muhammad Anwar, the chief of the Kom village of 
Kamdesh. Anwar had served in the civil service under Zahir Shah and was briefly 
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imprisoned by the Khalq regime before leading the first anti-government revolt in 
1978.29 After expelling the central government, Anwar organized areas under his 
control along traditional Kom governance structures: 
Anwar established a hierarchy of civilian leadership linking the 
various Kom villages. In each village, he appointed a wurjeṣṭ, who, 
in addition to enforcing traditional community regulations, would 
assure that all men served their allotted military duty and that no 
one took advantage of the families of men away on such duty. The 
wurjeṣṭs also serve as representatives to a tribal parliament which 
meets when the need arises to discuss the general conduct of the 
conflict…Parallel to the system of village leaders, Anwar 
established the role of military leader for each village to command 
the fighters from the village. Men from each village serve military 
duty according to sazi [50-person kinship group] affiliation, as is 
traditional.30  
 
This parallel civil-military governance structure, while successful in resisting the 
Soviets, came under pressure from U.S. and Pakistani-backed mujahedeen groups, 
especially Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami. Shortly after the Soviet invasion, Hekmatyar 
began establishing ties with fundamentalist mullahs in Nuristan whom he directed to 
recruit fighters to his organization.31 Anwar’s Nuristan Front, which did not receive 
substantial external support, could not compete with Hekmatyar, and, by 1984, the 
Hezb-i Islami emerged as the dominant force in southern Nuristan.  
To the north, Nuristani Islamist mullah Maulvi Muhammad Afzal established 
the “Islamic Revolutionary State of Afghanistan” in the upper Bashgal Valley, near 
Bargi Matal. Supported financially by Saudi Arabia, Afzal’s mini-state acted as a 
bridgehead for Arab fighters (and their Wahhabi ideology) in northeast Nuristan.32 
Afzal’s religious orthodoxy did not prevent him from playing on the tribal rivalries 
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between the Kata, who lived in the northeast, and the Kom, in the Hekmatyar-
controlled south of the valley, to expand his control by killing and exiling traditional 
Nuristani leadership.33  
The growth of the Islamist parties in eastern Afghanistan was facilitated by 
influx of American and Saudi aid, which was funneled through the Pakistani ISI. 
Almost immediately after the Soviet invasion, President Carter authorized the 
shipment of arms–mostly antiquated .303 Lee Enfield bolt-action rifles and RPG-7s–
to Pakistan for distribution among the resistance. As the war progressed, the US 
provided more sophisticated weapons, including the notorious “Stinger” shoulder-
fired anti-aircraft missiles. These arms shipments were turned over to Pakistan’s ISI 
for distribution to the anti-Soviet fighters. The CIA was instructed “to defer to 
Pakistani priorities” in the operation.34 The ISI had maintained Hekmatyar as a client 
since early 1970s and did its best to support the Hezb-i Islami. Even after the CIA 
pushed the ISI to distribute aid to other commanders, the Pakistanis still focused their 
support on the seven official Islamist parties based in Peshawar.35 During 
Congressional hearings in 1987, CIA officers testified that Hekmatyar and Rabbani 
received about fifty percent of the American and Saudi aid.36 While the US 
government was satisfied as long as their arms found their way to anti-Soviet fighters, 
the foreign aid also enabled the Pakistanis to encourage the replacement of traditional 
leadership structures with Islamist groups.  
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“The Lion of the Panjsher”  
With traditional leaders already weakened by the communist government, the 
mobilization of the anti-Soviet resistance after 1980 further redistributed intra-qawm 
political authority towards the kamandan. According to Dorronsoro, during the 
1980s, there were “several thousand commanders in Afghanistan, whose influence 
varied substantially, ranging from Massoud, the organizer of an army of more than 
10,000 men, down to a village notable at the head of a handful of mujahedeen.”37 In 
some areas, local commanders received sufficient external support to create parallel 
governing structures to traditional society. This was the case in eastern Nuristan, 
where Hekmatyar’s foreign support enabled him to be openly hostile towards tribal 
elders.38 Other commanders, such as Massoud, did not receive significant external 
support and had to rely on qawm leadership for legitimacy. 
Learning from his failure in 1975, Massoud regularly consulted with Panjsheri 
elders and religious leaders during the Soviet war.39 Because he lacked initial external 
support, Massoud launched regular attacks on the neighboring Salang Pass, which 
was the main artery for Soviet supply convoys. Not considering an attack successful 
unless his troops brought back supplies, Massoud quickly earned the enmity of the 
Soviet army.40 Between 1980 and 1982, the Soviets launched six major attacks into 
the Panjsher, all of which were repelled by Massoud’s fighters. In 1984, the Soviets 
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launched a 20,000-man invasion of the Panjsher Valley. After a week of high-altitude 
bombing, the Soviets, supported by up-armored Mi-24 attack helicopters and 
Spetsnaz special forces troops, entered to area to find it deserted. Massoud had 
evacuated 40,000 Panjsheris from the valley.41 His successful resistance against the 
Soviet army earned him the sobriquet the “Lion of the Panjsher,” and brought his 
fighters limited support from the British and French, whose agents travelled to the 
Panjsher disguised as journalists. 42  
In 1986, Massoud founded the Supervisory Council of the North (Shura-i 
Nazar-i Shamali) to coordinate Jamaat-i Islami’s forces in northeast Afghanistan. The 
SCN consisted of mainly Tajik commanders and came to control parts of Kapisa, 
Parwan, Kabul, Kunduz, Baghlan, Balkh, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces.43 
Massoud’s organization incorporated, rather than replaced local and religious leaders, 
ensuring a more stable relationship between the military command and the societal 
leaders than existed in other regions. This internal stability allowed Massoud to 
transform the SCN from a military command to quasi-state that provided services 
(such as military training, education, dispute resolution, medical aid, etc.) to its 
civilian population.44 As the Soviet war drew to a close, Massoud’s military successes 
and inclusive leadership style positioned him to emerge as a national political figure. 
Massoud’s leadership of the jihad in northeastern Afghanistan, however, was 
contested by his longtime rival Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Beginning in 1985, Hekmatyar 
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began attacking Massoud’s forces so often, that American intelligence analysts 
“feared he might be a secret KGB plant whose mission was to sow disruption within 
the anti-communist resistance.”45 Once the common Soviet enemy was defeated, the 
intensity of these intra-resistance fights would lead Afghanistan towards civil war.  
 
Soviet Withdrawal and the Beginnings of Civil War 
By the mid-1980s, the war in Afghanistan, which had begun as a quick 
operation to support a faltering communist ally–à la Czechoslovakia 1968–had 
become the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. After seven years of operations, 115,000 Soviet 
troops struggled to hold the major urban areas and highways while irregular forces 
controlled over eighty five percent of the country.46 Over 12,000 Soviet soldiers had 
been killed and billions of dollars spent propping up the Karmal regime. When 
Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union in 1985, he recognized that 
his ambitions to reform his country’s stagnant political system and economy required 
closing the “bleeding wound” that the Afghan war had become. In a Politburo 
meeting in November 1986, Gorbachev instructed his commanders to “help speed up 
the process so we have a friendly neutral country, and get out of there.”47    
 Afghan President Babrak Karmal did not share Gorbachev’s enthusiasm for a 
speedy Soviet withdrawal. When the two leaders met, Karmal indicated that he was 
“expecting that [the Soviets] will be in Afghanistan for a long time, if not forever.”48 
Karmal’s reliance on the Soviet military to prop his regime led Moscow to question 
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his post-withdrawal survivability. In May 1986, under pressure from the Soviet 
Union, Karmal resigned (for “medical reasons”), and, after a brief interim presidency, 
Muhammad Najibullah was installed as president. An Ahmadzai Ghilzai Pashtun 
from Gardez, Najibullah had served as the head of the Khedmat-i Etala’at-i Dawlati 
(KhAD) Afghan intelligence service since 1980. With advice and technical support 
from the KGB, Najibullah had developed KhAD into one of the Afghan 
government’s most feared institutions, with “virtually unlimited powers for tracking 
down enemies of the Communist regime.”49 Shortly after taking power, Najibullah 
was instructed by Gorbachev to plan for a Soviet withdrawal within eighteen months 
to two years.50 
 In order to strengthen his political position, Najibullah attempted to reach out 
to the resistance by proposing a coalition government of the major kamandan, 
including Massoud, who was offered the Defense Ministry.51 Although the ISI-
backed mujahedeen leaders in Peshawar rejected the offer, Najibullah still attempted 
to burnish the rural legitimacy of the government by easing his predecessors’ 
antagonistic policies towards traditionalism and religion. Clerics were put on the 
government payroll and mosques were rebuilt. Nationalism, not communism, was 
promoted as the new ideology and the PDPA was reorganized into the Hezb-i Watan, 
or Homeland Party.52 The Soviet military supported Najibullah’s reconciliation 
attempts by curtailing major combat operations in early 1987. Between 1987 and 
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1989, Soviet operations were focused primarily on reacting to enemy attacks, 
supporting Najibullah’s forces, and providing route security for withdrawing troops.53 
 Wishing to avoid the fate of the retreating British army in 1842, the Soviets 
began negotiating safe passage with Massoud, whose forces were well-positioned to 
strike at the Salang Pass, through which the Soviets planned to move over 30,000 
troops out of Afghanistan.54 Massoud agreed to let the Soviets pass in exchange for 
money and the promise of a cease-fire. When Najibullah learned of the deal, he 
appealed directly to the Soviet Defense Minister, who ordered the commander of 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Boris Gromov, to abrogate the 
cease-fire. On January 23, 1979, the Soviets launched Operation Typhoon, a three-
day bombing campaign of the Panjsher. While the Soviets reported heavy losses 
among Massoud’s forces, it is likely that Massoud learned of the attack in advance 
from his well-placed intelligence sources in the Afghan army.55 Operation Typhoon 
did not support the Soviet withdrawal, but instead, in keeping with the balance of 
power calculations described in Chapter 2, was designed to weaken one of 
Najibullah’s main rivals.56 
 
Najibullah Maintains Power 
On February 15, 1989, General Gromov walked across the Friendship Bridge, 
spanning the Amu Darya into the Uzbek SSR, as the last Soviet soldier to leave 
Afghanistan. While the Soviet war in Afghanistan came to a close, the conflict 
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between the mujahedeen and the government continued. The CIA and the ISI 
believed that the Soviet withdrawal fatally weakened Najibullah and encouraged their 
Afghan clients to maintain pressure on the regime. Najibullah countered by 
employing similar political strategies to those adopted by successful Afghan leaders 
since the eighteenth century–ceding power to local leaders and securing sufficient 
external revenue to subsidize the government. Building on the national reconciliation 
program begun in 1987, Najibullah reformed the constitution to provide for a multi-
party system and more representative state institutions, including an independent 
judiciary and a legislature. Non-PDPA members were permitted to join the 
government as ministers and parliamentarians. The new constitution also recognized 
Islam as the official religion and prohibited laws which contravened Shar’ia.57 These 
efforts, taken with the departure of Soviet forces, improved the perception of the 
government among conservatives and gave societal leaders greater leeway to 
bandwagon with the state while preserving their internal legitimacy.  
 The Peshawar commanders, however, were not interested in reconciling with 
a regime whose days they believed were numbered. In March 1989, less than a month 
after the Soviet withdrawal, 10,000 fighters from Hezb-i Islami, Sayyaf’s Islamic 
Union, and several Arab organizations launched an attack on Jalalabad, where they 
hoped to install an interim government under Hekmatyar.58 Despite logistical support 
from the ISI and CIA, the mujahedeen proved unsuccessful in conventional warfare 
and failed to capture the city. While Najibullah’s reconciliation program had earned 
him the loyalty of some tribal and ethnic militias, his success in repelling the 
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mujahedeen was owed to significant military and economic aid Afghanistan received 
from the Soviet Union.59 Before departing, the Soviet army transferred 15,000 tons of 
ammunition, 990 armored vehicles, 142 artillery pieces, 43 multiple rocket launchers, 
and 1706 rocket launchers to Afghan forces.60 After the withdrawal, the Soviets 
continued to support the Afghan government with around $300 million a month in 
military and economic aid flown in to Bagram and Kabul.61  
 By relying on foreign aid to maintain power, Najibullah was following a 
pattern established by the first Afghan monarchs who cemented their tribal coalitions 
with wealth obtained from raiding India.62 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
the Afghan government turned to securing foreign aid by playing its great power 
neighbors against each other. While the foreign subsidies allowed leaders in Kabul to 
rule without imposing significant taxes, it also tied regime stability to policies and 
events outside the control of the Afghan monarchy. When external revenue was cut 
off, for example when Punjab was absorbed into the British Raj, Afghanistan 
experienced an erosion of state power and the reemergence of local leadership. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 proved no different.  
 
Civil War 
 As political unrest in Moscow gradually choked off Najibullah’s foreign 
support in late 1991, his control over Afghanistan began to ebb. In February 1992, 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, the communist-allied commander of the Uzbek Junbish-i Milli 
militia, defected with 40,000 of his troops to Massoud’s SCN. Dostum brought tanks, 
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artillery, and aircraft to Massoud’s ranks and shifted the military balance in the north 
in favor of the SCN. 63 Massoud, who had been receiving over $200,000 a month 
from the CIA to gain support from traditional leaders in the north, consolidated his 
forces and moved on Kabul.64  
 Massoud’s efforts were challenged by Hekmatyar, who took up position to the 
south of the capital and also prepared to dislodge the Najibullah government. 
Tensions between the two commanders were high, and despite the attempted 
mediation by a young Osama bin Laden, Hekmatyar would not agree to share power 
with Massoud.65 On April 25, 1992, Massoud and Dostum’s forces preempted 
Hekmatyar’s attack on Kabul by infiltrating the city and seizing the airport and 
several ministries. The Hezb-i Islami forces, supported by Arab fighters and the ISI, 
launched a counter-attack against Massoud, but failed to wrestle control from the 
better-positioned SCN. By April 30, Kabul was firmly in Massoud and Dostum’s 
control. Furious over his defeat, Hekmatyar pulled back and unleashed a barrage of 
tens of thousands of rockets at Kabul. The Afghan Civil War had begun. 
Shortly after the attack on Kabul, Najibullah was captured while attempting to 
flee and placed under house arrest in the UN compound. The mujahedeen 
commanders in Peshawar, all except Hekmatyar, agreed to form an interim 
government led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, the commander of the Afghanistan 
National Liberation Front. In June, power was transferred to Rabbani, who was 
chosen by a shura to become the first president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. 
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Rubin best describes the new state: “Perhaps this entity was Islamic, but it was hardly 
a state, and it certainly did not rule Afghanistan.”66  
From the onset, the Islamic State of Afghanistan was plagued by the same 
ethnic and qawm divisions which had long defined Afghan politics. The rise of non-
Pashtun leaders, such as Dostum, Massoud and Rabbani, allowed Hekmatyar to 
portray his opposition as a form of Pashtun nationalism. The new state, despite its 
Islamic moniker, was also a reflection of Pashtun qawm politics. During the collapse 
of the Najibullah government, several Mohammadzai Parcham military officers 
defected to the SCN, while Khalq-affiliated Paktiawal and Ghilzai commanders and 
ministers joined forces with Hekmatyar. The tension between the two belligerents 
thus took on the mantle of the well-established intra-Pashtun political rivalries. In 
December 1992, more cracks emerged in the coalition when Massoud’s forces fought 
Iranian-backed Shi’a militias for control of Kabul University. The main Shi’a party, 
Hezb-i Wahdat, and Dostum’s Janbish militia allied with Hekmatyar against 
Massoud.  
The protracted struggle between the rival militias resulted in the devolution of 
central power to externally supported regional ethnic leaders. Uzbeks and Ismailis 
under Dostum received support from Uzbekistan and dominated in the north around 
Mazar-e Sharif. Massoud’s SCN controlled the Tajik northeast and established 
relations with opposition fighters in Tajikistan. The Iranian-backed Hazara Shi’a 
ruled the center of the country and Ismail Khan governed Herat and the surrounding 
areas. Hekmatyar maintained control in the east, although Nuristan was still under the 
influence of Maulvi Afzal. 
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While the mujahedeen commanders consolidated their control in the non-
Pashtun and Islamist-dominated regions of Afghanistan, political power remained 
diffuse in the Durrani south. After the overthrow of Zahir Shah in 1973, the Durrani 
were squeezed out of national politics. As none of the major CIA and ISI-supported 
mujahedeen leaders were Durrani Pashtuns, once the Soviets withdrew, no group 
emerged as a dominant power in the south. By 1994, the power vacuum had resulted 
in a chaotic social and political environment marked by “banditry, brutality against 
local residents, and offenses against local values, such as nang (reputation) and 
namus (local honor with respect to women)” committed by former mujahedeen.67 The 
collapse of political and social order in the south opened the door to the rise of a new 
political movement that promised to restore stability and Islamic values to 
Afghanistan.  
 
The Rise of the Taliban 
The popular narrative cultivated by the Taliban portrays the group as “a naïve, 
pious, determined band of religious students [who were] swept into power on a wave 
of popular revulsion over Qandahar’s criminal warlords.”68 In reality, the Taliban 
took power in the same way as previous Afghan regimes–by playing qawm and 
regional politics. In November 1994, a Pakistani truck convoy transporting goods to 
Turkmenistan was stopped at gunpoint at an extralegal Hekmatyar checkpoint on the 
Quetta-Qandahar road. The convoy was part of the Pakistani “transport mafia,” a 
group of ISI and army officers that shipped duty-free goods to Afghanistan and then 
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re-exported them illegally to neighboring states.69 The incident provoked the 
Pakistanis, and later that month, two hundred religious students and fighters under the 
command of a local mullah and veteran of the anti-Soviet resistance named 
Muhammad Omar, received Pakistani support to seize the Hekmatyar checkpoint.70 
As the religious students, or taliban in Pashto, began opening up more roads for 
commercial traffic, they garnered support from powerful Durrani merchants and tribal 
leaders. In late 1994, the leaders of the Durrani Ahmadzai and Popalzai tribes 
bandwagoned with the Taliban, signaling “that the student militia stood at the 
forefront of a broad movement–an uprising aimed at the enemies of Islam and also at 
the enemies of Pashtuns.”71 In their meetings with tribal leaders, the Taliban 
presented themselves as pious Pashtun nationalists who sought to restore the Durrani 
monarchy under the exiled Zahir Shah. They capitalized on the southern distrust of 
Massoud and Hekmatyar, who were perceived as usurpers to the traditionally Durrani 
throne. 
As their tribal and Pakistani support grew in late 1994, the Taliban captured 
Qandahar and pushed into Helmand, Zabul, and Uruzgan provinces territory, driving 
out the mujahedeen commanders and disarming the local militias. In early 1995, as 
Hekmatyar was forced to fall back from his stronghold in Chaharasyab, south of 
Kabul, Massoud attacked Hekmatyar’s Shi’a Hezb-i Wahdat allies, who then began 
fighting both Massoud and the Taliban. In the chaos, the SCN pushed both the Shi’a 
and the Taliban out of rocket-range of Kabul. In June 1996, Hekmatyar’s military 
strength and Pakistani support had so deteriorated that he was forced to join the 
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Rabbani government. The Taliban continued their advance, and on September 27, 
1996, they succeeded in capturing Kabul.72 Massoud pulled back to the Panjsher 
Valley and the Taliban proclaimed a new government – the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan. 
 
Social Effects of Taliban Rule 
 Shortly after capturing Kabul, the Taliban Ministry for the Promotion of 
Virtue and the Prevention of Vice issued a series of edicts to “advise people how to 
behave according to the Shari’a.”73 Many of the new laws, however, had no 
foundation in the Qur’an or in traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Women were banned 
from the working in all fields except medicine and made to wear a head-to-toe 
covering outside of the house. Men were forced to grow out their beards and 
prohibited from having “British or American hairstyles.”74 Social activities, such as 
kite-flying, pigeon keeping, playing music and even soccer were either banned or 
restricted. The Taliban’s antipathy for anything they perceived as un-Islamic would 
later lead to the destruction of two large statues of Buddha carved into the cliffs 
outside in Bamiyan. As the Taliban continued to consolidate its rule, its regressive 
social and cultural policies, implemented in such an American Cheese fashion, 
weakened the movement’s legitimacy among urban populations, non-Pashtuns, and 
the international community.  
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Taliban Governance Style  
In addition to imposing strict social regulations, the Taliban consolidated their 
power by co-opting Pashtun leaders. The Taliban were not motivated by qawm 
interests, but they successfully played on local rivalries to divide and control 
competing centers of political influence. Sinno identifies four Taliban tactics for 
expanding their power at the expense of tribal leaders. First, they approached the 
most vulnerable leaders in a regional power configuration. These leaders’ 
vulnerability made them more willing to join the Taliban to ensure survival. Second, 
the Taliban approached key clients before confronting their regional patrons. For 
example, during their fight against Hekmatyar, the Taliban preferred to co-opt his 
local commanders rather than confront the entire Hezb-i Islami directly. Similarly, the 
defection of one of Dostum’s lieutenants to the Taliban led to the fall of Mazar-e 
Sharif in 1998. Then, the Taliban calibrated their message to compete for the loyalty 
of local leaders’ rank and file. The impression that the Taliban were neutral religious 
figures who were providing stability and order was integral to their popular 
legitimacy. Finally, the Taliban were successful in consolidating their control because 
they focused on weakening the major tribal leaders and commanders who could 
challenge their power while permitting other, less important qawms to rule 
autonomously.75 This was especially evident in the Taliban’s approach to governing 
Nuristan.  
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Taliban Rule in Nuristan 
 Unlike in much of the rest of the country, when the Taliban arrived in 
Nuristan in 1996, they did not attempt to disarm the local militias or rule the province 
directly. Instead, the Taliban formed alliances with local Islamist leaders, notably 
Maulvi Afzal, whom they allowed ruled autonomously. However, as these leaders 
were not “big and established strongmen with good self-governance skills” (i.e. 
traditional tribal leaders), political power in Nuristan became increasingly 
fragmented.76 In June 1998, a dispute over water rights between Kamdesh and 
Kushtoz erupted in violence between the two villages that resulted in the rocketing 
and destruction of Kushtoz. A similar dispute in the Waigal Valley in 2001 resulted in 
six deaths.77  
 Klimburg characterized the Taliban approach to governance in Nuristan as 
reminiscent of the pre-Islamic political situation, when the area’s communities were 
entirely autonomous.78 The Taliban’s pursuance of a Swiss Cheese policy of local 
rule in Nuristan was conditioned by three factors: the region’s Islamic orthodoxy, 
strategic insignificance and neutrality in the fight against Massoud. As Sinno explains 
above, the Taliban derived much of their popular legitimacy from their perceived 
religious orthodoxy. The Nuristani religious leaders, many of whom had been 
educated in fundamentalist Pakistani schools in the 1960s and supported by Saudi 
Arabia in the 1980s, were suitable partners by the Taliban’s standards.79 
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 The Taliban approach to Nuristan was also influenced by the strategic 
unimportance and geographic inaccessibility of the region. While Nuristan would 
become a corridor for Taliban infiltration from Pakistan after the US invasion, in the 
late 1990s, the Taliban were still mainly supplied by the ISI via Quetta. The cost of 
invading and occupying Nuristan–heightened by the region’s mountainous 
geography–were not justified by the area’s lack of strategic significance to the 
Taliban. For Massoud’s fighters, however, Nuristan did hold strategic significance as 
another front to challenge the Taliban. Following the fall of Kabul, Muhammad 
Sarwar, who had served as Minister of Defense in Afzal’s “Islamic Revolutionary 
State” in the mid-1980s but was more recently allied with Massoud, returned to 
Nuristan to “regain influence for the sake of the Northern Alliance,” as Massoud’s 
forces had become known.80 After less than a year, he was captured by the Taliban 
and imprisoned in Qandahar. Taliban concerns over the influence of the Northern 
Alliance in Nuristan also shaped their policy toward Afzal, whom they prevented 
from collecting taxes for fear that it would drive the local population to support the 
Northern Alliance.81 The inability to collect taxes led to the decline of Afzal’s 
influence in the Nuristan, and he was forced to move to Pakistan.  
 
The Northern Alliance 
 The Taliban were justified in their concerns over Massoud. After pulling back 
from Kabul, the Lion of the Panjsher created a balancing alliance with the other 
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defeated ethnic militias in the north, including his former enemies Dostum and the 
Shi’a Hezb-i Wahdat. Massoud also reached out for financial and military support 
from Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and India, all of whom were threatened by 
the rise of the Taliban. The Northern Alliance established training camps in Tajikistan 
and, as the Taliban continued their advance, Massoud relocated his family to 
Dushanbe. In late 1996, Massoud renewed contact with the CIA, whose primary 
interest in Afghanistan had become buying up Stinger missiles distributed during the 
1980s. The CIA did not put Massoud back on their payroll, but did provide him with 
some communications equipment to assist with the Stinger buy-back program.82  
After the al-Qaeda attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 
the CIA increasingly focused its attention on the Saudi Islamist financier Osama bin 
Laden. When the Clinton administration authorized the capture of bin Laden, the CIA 
turned to Massoud, who was willing to help remove the Taliban’s key ally. Beginning 
in 1998, the CIA began make regular contact with Massoud’s forces in northeastern 
Afghanistan. American support was limited, however, and the administration 
prevented the CIA from providing assistance that would “fundamentally alter the 
Afghan battlefield” in favor of Massoud.83    
In May 1998, despite continued pressure from the Northern Alliance, the 
Taliban captured Mazar-e Sharif and sent Dostum into exile. Within days of the city’s 
fall, Pakistan recognized the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan. Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose leadership viewed the Taliban’s 
religious conservatism favorably, followed suit. As the Taliban invaded the north, 
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they subjugated the non-Pashtun populations to “a form of internal colonialism” that 
featured “large scale massacres” and population resettlement, tactics reminiscent of 
Abdur Rahman.84 Their ranks flush with over 10,000 Arab, Pakistani, and Central 
Asian fighters, the Taliban closed in on Massoud, shrinking the area of Northern 
Alliance control to less than ten percent of Afghanistan by early 2001.85   
 
The Lion is Dead  
 On September 9, 2001, two al-Qaeda operatives posing as North African 
journalists were granted an interview with Ahmad Shah Massoud at his camp in 
northern Takhar province. Shortly after the interview began, a bomb the men had 
concealed in their camera detonated, killing one of the attackers and tearing 
Massoud’s chest open with shrapnel. Unconscious, the Lion of the Panjsher was 
loaded into a helicopter and flown to a hospital in Tajikistan. He died minutes later.  
 The effects of Massoud’s assassination were not confined to Afghanistan. On 
September 4, 2001, the Bush administration instructed the CIA to provide the 
Northern Alliance with trucks, uniforms, ammunition, mortars, helicopters, and other 
equipment as part of a new policy of confronting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The loss 
of Massoud called into question the political and military survivability of the 
Northern Alliance. After the September 11 attacks, it became clear that the timing of  
the assassination was designed to weaken the retaliatory capability of the United  
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States against al-Qaeda.86  
 Within days of the attacks, CIA paramilitary officers and Special Forces teams 
began infiltrating Afghanistan to prepare the ground for the U.S. response. Combat 
operations began on October 7, 2001 and have continued since.  
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Tribal Democracy: 
Contemporary Developments and New Approach to Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Along with the pakul hat, war rugs are one of the staple souvenirs for foreign 
soldiers, aid workers, and journalists visiting Afghanistan. Since the anti-Soviet jihad, 
merchants in Kabul’s Chicken Street have sold foreigners rugs that depict images of 
weapons, fighters, and military leaders. The rugs first featured images of the Soviets, 
then Najibullah, and more recently Massoud, Dostum, and Karzai. In late 2001, rugs 
with a new design began appearing in the Kabul markets–two airplanes flying into the 
World Trade Center superimposed by a dove and the US and Afghan flags. At the 
base of this popular version, fighter jets take off from an aircraft carrier and fly 
toward Afghanistan. During an exhibit in New York City, the carpets caused a stir 
among the American audience. Some thought the rugs were in poor taste, possibly 
woven in celebration of the September 11 attacks. However, as Mascelloni points out, 
war rugs, despite their inherent political content, do not convey an explicit political 
message, but rather serve as “soft and variable backdrops” of the environment in 
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which they are produced.1 The 9/11 war rugs signaled the beginning of the latest 
chapter of the conflict between state and society in Afghanistan: the American 
invasion.   
Like the Soviet war in Afghanistan, the American war began with the 
insertion of small paramilitary and Special Forces teams and evolved into a prolonged 
occupation sustained by over 100,000 troops. Despite initial successes in routing al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, the initial U.S. strategy did not conform to the historical 
trends and theoretical approaches identified in the previous chapters. By maintaining 
a light footprint that focused on counterterrorism while leaving the establishment of 
security to the new Afghan interim government, the US inadvertently permitted the 
conditions for the resurgence of the Taliban by failing to alter the internal balance of 
power in Afghanistan. The new Afghan government led by Hamid Karzai has since 
pursued the same polices of internal imperialism, internal colonialism, and an 
American Cheese approach to governance as Afghanistan’s unsuccessful twentieth 
century rulers. While some attempts, most notably the National Solidarity Program, 
have been made to incorporate and encapsulate local leaders, the Afghan government 
retains a hostile attitude towards the official devolution of power that may be 
necessary for the long-term stability of Afghanistan.  
Before turning to contemporary developments, however, this chapter will first 
examine the applicability of the theoretical approaches described in Chapter 2 
throughout Afghanistan’s political history. After exploring Afghanistan’s recent 
political history through the lens of these theoretical approaches, this thesis will 
conclude by suggesting a successful model for state-society relations in Afghanistan. 
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Figure 6.1 Fusion and Fission in Modern Afghanistan 
 Regime                                Reign             
 
Ahmad Shah Durrani 1747-1793 Fusion  
Zaman Shah, Shah Shuja 1793-1819 Fission 
Dost Muhammad  1819-1863  Fusion 
Sher Ali  1863-1879  Fission 
Abdur Rahman 1880-1901 Fusion 
Habibullah, Amanullah  1901-1929 Fission 
Musahiban 1929-1973 Fusion 
PDPA 1978-1992 Fission 
Taliban 1994-2001 Fusion (in Taliban-controlled areas) 
Karzai 2001-2011  Fusion (in non-Pashtun areas) 
 
Tribe-State Relations throughout Afghan History 
The theories of Dupree, Barfield, Shahrani, Migdal and Waltz accurately 
describe the political behavior of state and societal actors throughout Afghanistan’s 
history. Dupree’s characterization of state formation as the building of an “internal 
empire” is observable in Afghanistan since 1747, when Ahmad Shah, the leader of a 
relatively weak tribe, was chosen by his fellow Pashtuns to lead the Durrani 
confederation. The selection of a monarch whose rule was contingent on the good 
will of the Durrani leadership ensured that “the monarch’s first task was to satisfy the 
interests of his own clansmen” before those of the state.2 Despite conquering Kabul, 
Peshawar, the Punjab, Herat, and Mashhad, the monarch’s power was continually 
checked by the “tribal-feudal socioeconomic framework,” which required the consent 
of the Durrani tribal chieftains.3 The empire held together until 1793, when the 
Durrani coalition weakened and power devolved to local leaders. In 1819, the pattern 
was repeated when Dost Muhammad built up support among his Barakzai kinsmen 
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and again began expanding the monarchy’s control through military conquest and 
“judicious marriages.”4 After his death in 1863, Afghanistan entered a period of 
political fission that lasted until the rise of Abdur Rahman in 1880.   
Writing in the early 1970s, Dupree argued that the practice of internal 
imperialism ended with Abdur Rahman. A closer examination of the Iron Emir’s 
consolidation strategy–which relied on tribal alliances and perpetual conquest–and 
the subsequent devolution of political power under Habibullah and Amanullah 
indicate that his state was an internal empire. The Musahiban similarly relied on tribal 
confederations and the distribution of political power to qawm allies, such as the 
Nuristanis, to maintain their hold on Afghanistan. Once the monarchy collapsed, 
political power again became diffuse and remained so until the 1990s, when the 
Taliban gained control by unifying their Pashtun base and conquering the rest of 
Afghanistan. 
Shahrani’s description of internal colonialism is similarly reflected in 
contemporary political developments in Afghanistan. As with the process of fusion 
and fission of central power, internal colonialism was evident under Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, who distributed landholdings and important state offices to leaders of the 
various Durrani subtribes. “Non-Durrani tribes received an insignificant amount of 
land,” despite paying most of the taxes and providing most of the soldiers.5 By not 
incorporating leaders from other groups, the Durrani Empire was a “mechanism by 
which the Pashtun tribes under [Ahmad Shah’s] command ruled over other 
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territories.”6Abdur Rahman continued the process of Durrani colonialism by 
conducting ethnic cleansing against the Hazara, forcing the conversion of the Kafiris, 
and relocating his Ghilzai Pashtun rivals to northern Afghanistan to ensure that their 
primary identification would be ethnic and not tribal.7 The Iron Emir’s military 
conquests were followed in the 1920s by the “Pashtunization” of the state under the 
guidance of Mahmud Tarzi. Pashto, which Tarzi regarded as the “true national 
language,” was elevated over Persian and textbooks depicted Afghanistan as a purely 
Pashtun creation, denying the historical contribution of non-Pashtuns.8 The 
combination of the violent suppression of non-leadership ethnic and tribal groups 
with the imposition of Pashtun-centric ideology was also evident during the rise of 
the PDPA and the Taliban. 
The approaches of Dupree and Shahrani, while providing an account of how 
the state acts towards qawm groups, do not adequately consider the agency of societal 
leaders, and, as a result, do not provide a complete illustration of all of the conditions 
that bear on state-society relations in Afghanistan. However, by blending the 
approaches of Dupree and Shahrani with those of Midgal and Waltz, it becomes 
apparent that, in addition to the governance strategy employed by the state, the 
internal power distribution of Afghanistan is influenced by the perceptions and 
decisions of societal groups. The balancing and bandwagoning behavior of qawm 
groups reaches back thousands of years to the decision by the Sogdian and Kafiri 
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tribes to ally with Alexander the Great. Similarly, the invading Umayyads, 
Shaybands, Moghuls, and Safavids all found local allies who assisted in their 
conquest of Afghanistan in order to advance their interests in the new empires. 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, small powers in Afghanistan continued 
to bandwagon when the dominant power, the Durrani state, appeared strong. 
Beginning with Abdur Rahman, the state began to cultivate an “aura of military 
invincibility” that encouraged qawms to ally with the dominant power. 9 This 
perception endured through Musahiban period, providing Afghanistan with four 
decades of stability earned, not through state-building, but through small powers 
bandwagoning with the monarchy. Small powers have also bandwagoned with the 
state against other small powers, such as the communist-encouraged Gujars, 
Mishwanis, Gawars, and Shinwari Pashtun attack on the rebellious Nuristani tribes in 
1978.   
 Societal groups have also demonstrated a tendency to balance against the 
dominant power when it suited their interests. The 1709 revolt in Qandahar against 
the Safavids was an act of balancing against an empire whose distance and declining 
capabilities led to a successful outcome for Mir Wais and the Pashtun tribes. The 
national resistance against the British during the First Anglo-Afghan War did not 
begin until 1841, two years after the invasion, when the traditional powerbrokers 
“detected the weakness of their rulers.”10 During the rule of Amanullah, the Khost 
Rebellion signaled the monarchy’s waning capabilities and fostered a perception of 
weakness that led to a national rebellion in 1928. The balancing behavior of qawm 
                                                 
9 Barfield, 187.  
10 David Lyon, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American Occupation. 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 50.   
 108 
groups in Afghanistan became especially apparent after the Saur Revolution, when 
the bandwagoning-induced tribal peace of the Musahiban gave way to system-wide 
attempts to challenge the new government. While opponents of the communists may 
have cloaked their resistance in Islamist and nationalist ideology, they would not have 
challenged the dominant power if they did not believe it would advance their interests 
or security.  
 
Contemporary Afghanistan 
The same trends that are observable through modern Afghan political history 
continue to shape contemporary state-society relations. After beginning military 
operations in Afghanistan in October 2001, the US pursued a “light footprint” 
strategy that relied on Special Operations Forces and CIA paramilitary officers to 
direct airstrikes and coordinate supply drops while leaving the Northern Alliance to 
engage in most of the ground fighting. This approach was “cheap in dollar and 
manpower terms and driven by technology,” but it did not create the conditions 
necessary for the defeat of the Taliban by shifting the internal balance of power in 
Afghanistan.11 Rashid describes the political environment in the early days of the 
war: 
The Afghan people were literally on their knees begging for a 
greater international presence so that their benighted country could 
be rebuilt. Afghans were savvy. They knew that more foreign 
troops meant greater security, and also a greater commitment to 
reconstructing the country…Yet the lack of larger Western military 
presence meant that the warlords rather than the government 
remained empowered. Afghans understood well enough that 
without security there could be no economic development, and if 
the West was refusing to provide that security, and was instead 
                                                 
11 Ahmad Rashid, Descent into Chaos. (New York: Viking Press, 2008), 96.  
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depending on the warlords, then it was also insincere about 
rebuilding the country. 12 
 
The Bush administration’s focus on building a case for war against Saddam Hussein 
in 2002 further diverted resources and attention from Afghanistan. The message to 
the warlords and the potential Taliban supporters was clear: The US is not serious 
about supporting the government in Kabul; the balance of power has not shifted.  
In February 2002, the British-led, 6,500-man International Security and 
Assistance Force deployed to Kabul to provide breathing room for the new 
government. The force’s commander, General McColl, argued for the expansion of 
ISAF outside the capital so that international troops could replace the militia 
commanders and keep the peace. The proposal was rejected by Washington, which 
was pursuing an unstated strategy of leaving “Karzai ineffectual in the capital, 
protected by foreign forces, while relying on the warlords to keep Pax Americana in 
the countryside and U.S. SOF forces to hunt down al Qaeda…By following such a 
strategy, the United States left everything in place from the Taliban era except for the 
fact of regime change.”13  
As the US was pursuing a strategy that could not pacify Afghanistan, the new 
Afghan government was falling into the same patterns of governance described by 
Dupree, Shahrani, and Barfield. In December 2001, after the fall of Kabul, leaders of 
the different Afghan factions met in Bonn to choose an interim government. Some of 
the delegates, such as proponents of restoring the monarchy under Zahir Shah, had 
not set foot in Afghanistan since the 1970s. The Northern Alliance delegation was 
                                                 
12 Ibid, 196  
13Ibid, 133.  
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comprised mainly of Panjsheris. There were no southern Pashtuns.14 Karzai delivered 
the opening statement to the conference via satellite phone from Tarin Kot, in 
southern Afghanistan.15 His role as a charismatic leader who appeared to be able to 
unify the various powerbrokers in Afghanistan followed Dupree’s model of state 
fission. Unfortunately, in the years since Karzai’s election, he has followed the 
example of previous Durrani monarchs by placing the interests of his own clansmen 
ahead of those of the state.   
 In December 2003, a constitutional jirga was convened in Kabul to decide on 
the shape of the future government. The debate centered on two approaches to 
restructuring the Afghan state: a unitary presidential model (American Cheese) or a 
federal parliamentary system (Swiss Cheese). Many Pashtun delegates supported the 
presidential model as a means to reestablish their dominance in the government after 
the advanced made by the Tajiks.16 Conversely, ethnic minority leaders and regional 
commanders favored a more decentralized power arrangement. The jirga attempted to 
reconcile these positions by suggesting a mix of the two systems that was reminiscent 
of Lebanese confessionalism – splitting the executive between a directly elected 
Pashtun president and a parliament-chosen non-Pashtun prime minister.17  
The proposal was rejected by the drafting commission in favor of a unitary 
presidential system. Rubin, who was an adviser to the constitutional jirga, explains 
the commission’s rationale behind the adaptation of a presidential system:  
Decades of internal warfare have left standing only the weakest of 
security institutions. The rule of law still does not extend over 
                                                 
14 Ibid, 103. 
15 Ibid, 96.  
16 Barfield, 298.  
17 Barnett Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 3 
(July 2004), 11.  
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much of the country, and political parties are feeble and 
embryonic…The presidentialists’ argument persuaded those who 
worry that that a parliament chosen under these arduous conditions 
is too likely to be a fragmented body dominated by warlords, local 
factions, and even drug traffickers. In his speech to the 
[Constitutional Loya Jirga]’s closing session, President Karzai 
cited post-1945 Italy and India since the Congress Party’s decline 
as negative examples. Afghanistan’s most urgent need is a 
functioning government. Presidentialism’s advocates – who are not 
all Pashtuns – say that such a system, with its greater potential for 
what Alexander Hamilton called “energy and dispatch,” is more 
likely to bring such a state about.18 
 
Abdul Liwal, a Karzai adviser who was one of the spokesmen of the constitutional 
jirga provided me with a similar explanation for the choice of centralism over 
federalism:   
The priority is stability. Instability is not caused by not giving 
control to provinces. Real instability comes from our neighbors – 
from Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan – who have their own proxies 
and interests here. Instability is also caused by lack of 
infrastructure that prevents economic integration. To build a state, 
we must first have stability. Then we must improve the public’s 
knowledge about democracy. Once we have a strong state, we can 
think about decentralization. 19 
 
As with the Musahiban rulers during the previous century, the imperative of 
immediate “stability” overrode the long-term sustainability of the political order. The 
1964 Constitution, which had been temporarily adopted at Bonn, became the primary 
guide for the new document. According to Barfield:  
The appointment of governors, the right to taxation, and the 
provision of government services all remained the monopolies of 
the central government. The new constitution therefore had a 
strong monarchical flavor. In fact, it was later discovered that the 
original Persian version had failed to delete many references to the 
king in constitutional articles that were lifted wholesale from the 
1964 document.20 
 
The adaptation–almost directly–of the same qawm-state power configuration that had 
its roots in the internally colonialist American Cheese approach of Abdur Rahman 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 13.  
19 Interview with Abdul Liwal, Kabul, July 29, 2010. 
20 Barfield, 298-9. 
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would prove to be one of the largest obstacles to state formation under Karzai because 
it did not reflect the political reality outside of Kabul. In a replay of the 1990s, 
foreign-supported commanders continued to maintain their militias and govern as 
they saw fit. A key difference from the previous decade was that the Panjsheris, who 
had guided the first CIA teams into Afghanistan, dominated the security structure of 
the new order. Mohammad Fahim, Abdullah Abdullah, and Mohammad Arif, all 
former Massoud lieutenants, were named to lead the Ministries of Defense, Foreign 
Affairs, and domestic security, respectively.  
 After the initial war against the Taliban, the relaxed US strategy 
institutionalized qawm divisions and left the government weak and irrelevant. In the 
southeast, for example, Gul Agha Sherzai, a member of the Barakzai tribe was 
appointed governor of Qandahar over the objection of Karzai. Sherzai played on 
qawm politics, including the rivalry between the Barakzai and the Popalzai that 
reached back to the Shah Shuja-Dost Muhammad power struggle, to empower his 
tribe at the expense of other groups.21 The intra-Durrani tensions in Qandahar 
illustrated a larger pattern of conflict among the American-supported militia leaders 
and the nascent Karzai government across the country.  
 
Taliban Redux 
The empowerment of regional and local militia commanders delegitimized the 
Karzai government and set the conditions necessary for the return of the Taliban in 
early 2003. Giustozzi explains that “The failure of the central government to keep 
providing sufficient discretionary funds for the governors to interact with elders, 
                                                 
21 Rashid, 129.  
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Figure 6.2 Estimates of Taliban Strength (2002-2006) 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Core 3,000 4,000 4,500 5,500 7,000 
     core (active) 500-1,500 800-2,000 1,200-2,500 2,000-3,000 3,000-4,000 
     core madrassa- recruited  3,000 3,700 3,700 4,400 5,500 
     core village-recruited  0 300 800 1,100 1,500 
Non-core village recruited 1,000 3,000 5,000 7,000 10,000 
    average active      
     (core + non-core) 500-2,000 1,500-4,000 3,000-5,500 5,000-7,000 6,000-10,000 
Total 4,000 7,000 9,500 12,500 17,000 
Foreign Volunteers  1,500 1,000 700 1,200 2,000 
 
 
Adapted from Guistozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 35. 
clergy and other notables contributed decisively to undermine the administration.”22 
In short, the government was not able to convince regional powerbrokers to 
bandwagon with the state. The government’s lack of funds was driven by the 
independence of the regional militia commanders, who profited on import duties and 
the narcotics trade, but did not contribute to the national treasury. The inability of the 
government to even buy the loyalty of local leaders, combined with the 
institutionalization of the qawm rivalries described above, weakened the official 
subnational governance structures and provided an opening for the Taliban to 
reemerge. 
Guistozzi estimates that, between 2002 and 2006, the Taliban’s ranks grew 
from around 4,000 to 17,000 fighters. This resurgence was made possible by four 
inter-connected factors: the paucity of US troops in Afghanistan, increasing support 
from Pakistan, the weakness of the central government, and the erosion of traditional 
                                                 
22 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 19.  
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tribal leadership. The deployment of less than 10,000 NATO troops–most of which 
were not engaged in stability operations–in 2002-2003, and the shift in focus towards 
Iraq signaled the Pakistani government that the US did not take the Afghan war 
seriously. The ISI encouraged the government to maintain ties with the Taliban so 
that Pakistan would be able to exert an influence in Afghanistan after the coming 
American withdrawal. Whether the increase in support for the Taliban after 2001 was 
approved by President Musharraf or conducted by rogue ISI commanders is not clear. 
The scope and coordination of the Pakistani support, however, indicates that it was 
likely approved by the senior military leadership. Beginning in 2002, retired ISI and 
Frontier Corps officers were rehired under contract and dispatched to Quetta and 
Peshawar. These contractors did not maintain contact with local ISI or the military 
and worked cover jobs as aid workers, bureaucrats, and university professors. These 
officers were the primary conduit of support and sanctuary to the Taliban in Pakistan, 
but evaded detection through their non-official cover.23  
The increase in Taliban capabilities, unchecked by the low US troop levels 
contributed to a worsening security situation that inhibited the functions of the 
government in the south and east. With no guarantors of security, militia commanders 
refused to disarm and accept control by the Kabul government. At the same time, the 
continuing erosion of the power of tribal leaders, which began in 1978, weakened the 
organization of Afghan rural society. While tribal leaders supported the government, 
many young tribesmen fought for the Taliban, which provided them with “peace, 
                                                 
23 Rashid, 221-2. 
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income, a sense of purpose, a social network” that their tribes did not.24 Foreign 
military operations, largely conducted autonomously of tribal and local government 
leaders, further undermined the legitimacy of traditional governance structures. This 
frustration with tribal leadership allowed the Taliban to recruit “members of rival 
tribes under a common banner for long-term political action.”25 As during the 1990s, 
the Taliban were not a representation of qawm interests, but a response to the anarchy 
produced by competing qawm groups and regional actors in the system.   
 
Encapsulation: A Successful Approach to Governance in Afghanistan 
Considering the failures of the past decade, a more successful strategy for 
altering the balance of power in Afghanistan would be encapsulation, or the gradual 
preemption of the economic and political independence of societal groups by the 
state. In the twentieth century, state leaders in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey 
successfully pursued strategies of encapsulation that weakened previously 
independent societal leaders. In Afghanistan, encapsulation was attempted under the 
Musahiban; however these efforts were interrupted by the 1978 Saur Revolution. 
Rubin explains the circumstances under which encapsulation developed in 
Afghanistan:  
Because the state did not depend directly on the khans, it needed 
neither to confront them (as Abdul Rahman or Amanullah had) nor 
mobilize them for conquest (as Ahmad Shah Durrani had). Instead, 
both khans and ulama were given symbolic roles without real 
power and allowed considerable autonomy in their local affairs.26  
 
                                                 
24 David Montero, “Why the Taliban appeal to Pakistani youth,” The Christian Science Monitor,  June, 
16, 2006.  
25 Guistozzi, 39.  
26 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 
62.  
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In addition to positions within the state, societal rulers who bandwagoned with the 
monarchy were also rewarded with development projects and agricultural aid. 
Rubin’s description of encapsulation suggests that the approach empowered local 
leaders at the expense of the state. Salzman, however, argues that encapsulation 
weakens societal leaders in the long-term by heightening differentiation in economic 
power and political authority between tribal leaders and their fellow tribesmen. Citing 
Ottoman policies in Iraq, he writes:  
Tribal chiefs were given title to tribal lands customarily under 
collective ownership. The resulting economic stratification was so 
great that the chiefs pulled out of the tribal system altogether in 
order to join the economic upper class, leaving the government 
with wealthy, but administratively useless ex-chiefs and a 
fragmented tribal populace.27  
 
Anthropological studies of Afghanistan during the 1970s indicate that 
encapsulation was weakening the traditional role of tribal leaders. Strand, who 
conducted fieldwork with the Kom tribe in eastern Nuristan, observed that traditional 
local governance structures, or sazis, had become integrated into the Afghan 
administrative system and “served the Afghan government as a convenient system for 
gathering head taxes, military conscripts, and road repairmen.”28 Anderson made 
similar observations while living with the Ghilzai Pashtuns, when around 1966, the 
Afghan government began providing credits for rural farmers to purchase tractors. In 
most cases, the only farmers that could afford the tractors, even with the government 
subsidies, were the large landlords that held positions of leadership within the 
community. When the tractors were delivered, some leaders shared their tractors with 
                                                 
27 Phillip Carl Salzman, “Tribal Chiefs and Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation in the Middle 
East,” Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 1974), 208.  
28 Richard Strand, “A Note on Rank, Political Leadership and Government among the Pre-Islamic 
Kom,” Cultures of the Hindukush, Selected Papers from the Hindu-Kush Cultural Conference held at 
Moesgård, Denmark (1970), 61.  
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their tribesmen, while others charged for their use. This commercialization of the 
leader’s patronage eroded respect for the traditional leadership. One tribesman 
explained his dissatisfaction with his leader: “Sahib Khan? He is no khan. He has a 
tractor by plows only for himself. It is that way now, with tractors. There are no 
khans anymore.”29 While anecdotal, Strand and Anderson’s observations indicate that 
the Musahiban encapsulation strategy was yielding results, and, if it was not 
interrupted by Daoud’s coup and the Saur Revolution, state-society relations in 
contemporary Afghanistan would look much different today.  
A policy of encapsulation that empowers societal leaders, not military 
commanders, through economic development backed up by a military capable of 
imposing sanction on those who violate the rules of the system is in order in 
contemporary Afghanistan. Those who insist that Afghanistan is ungovernable are 
partially correct. Contemporary Afghanistan is ungovernable because the state is 
attempting to rule in a manner that is at odds with centuries of established political 
culture. Given the failures of the twentieth century, the path forward for Afghanistan 
is clear: a decentralized government that encapsulates, rather than fights with, societal 
groups.  
 
                                                 
29 Jon W. Anderson, “There Are No Khans Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in 
Tribal Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1978), 171.  
Glossary 
Abbreviations of Language Names 
Ar. – Arabic 
Carib. – Caribbean 
Gr. – Greek 
He. – Hebrew 
Km. – Kom 
Pash. – Pashto 
Pers. – Persian 
Ru. – Russian 
Truk. – Turkic
Uz. – Uzbek  
A Note on Transliteration
Throughout this work, foreign words have been transliterated to the spelling that is 
most common in similar scholarship. Most transliterated words have been italicized to 
visually  distinguish  these  words  and  highlight  foreign  vocabulary.  As  much  as 
possible, I have allowed for foreign words to take their English form. However, the 
lack of precise English equivalents for some words, such as qawm, has compelled me 
to use foreign terms throughout the text. Some of the italicized terminology, has, in 
fact,  been incorporated into English dictionaries, yet  I have chosen to differentiate 
these words with italicization nevertheless.  By re-representing words like  jihad  as 
foreign, I hope to symbolically divorce such a term from the connotations it carries to 
encourage a rediscovery of its meaning in its original contexts.
agha:  Turk. اقا “chief, master, or lord,” title for tribal chieftains, village leaders, and 
wealthy landlords in areas of the former Ottoman Empire. 
arbab:  Pers.بابببرا from  Ar.  plural  of بر ,  “lord,  master,  owner.”  Used  in  Iran, 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan as a title for an influential individual who represents his 
community to an outside power. 
 
asabiyyah: Ar. ةيبصع “group-feeling,” from بصع, “to bind together.” Used by Ibn 
Khaldun to describe kinship and tribal ties. 
Barakzai:  Pash.  ییازکرابب “sons  of  Barak,”  one  of  the  four  major  Durrani  Pashtun 
descent groups. 
118
Bashgal:  Valley  in  northeastern  Nuristan,  center  of  Mulavi  Afzal’s  Islamic 
Revolutionary State  of Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet  jihad.  Populated by the 
Kata tribe. 
 
bi-tarafi: Pers. ىفرط ىب  “without sides,” used to describe the neutral foreign policy of 
Afghanistan under Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud Khan (1953-63). 
cacique: Carib., person in a village or region who exercises political influence 
Deoband:  City in  northern India  home to the Darul  Uloom Deoband,  a center  of 
conservative Islamic thought associated with transnational Islamist movements. 
Durbar  Shahi:  Pers. ىهاش راببرد   “Royal  Council,”  Advisory council  established  by 
Amanullah (1919-29) whose membership was comprised of Durrani tribal leaders.  
Durrani:  Pash. ينارد from Pers.  plural of رد, “pearl,” one of the chief Pashtun tribal 
confederations.  Known as Abdali until the establishment of the Durrani Empire in 
1747.  
effendi:  Ar. يدنفأ, a corruption of the Medieval  Gr.  αφέντης “master”,  effendi  was a 
title of nobility used in the Ottoman Empire. 
Fatwa: Ar. ىوتف
ى
, a formal Islamic jurisprudential opinion. 
Ghaznawid: Pers. نایونزغ, a Persianate dynasty of Turkic origin which ruled much of 
present-day Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran, and Pakistan from 975 to 1187. 
Ghilzai: Pash. یزرغ, one of the largest Pashtun confederations, historical rivals of the 
Durrani. 
 
Hashtnafari:  Pers. ىرفنتشه “eight-man,”  a  conscription system implemented  under 
Abdur Rahman in which each  qawm sent one of every eight  men to serve in the 
national army. 
Hazara: Pers. هرازه derived from رازه, meaning “thousand,” and referring to a military 
unit of 1000 soldiers in Genghis Khan’s army, of whom the Hazara ethnic group are 
said  to  be  descendants.  The  Hazara  are  distinct  in  their  Asiatic  appearance  and 
adherence to Shi’a Islam. 
Hezb-i  Islami:  Pers.  ىملبسأ بزح “Party  of  Islam,”  Islamist  organization  under  the 
command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar active during the anti-Soviet jihad. 
Hezb-i  Watan:  Pers.  نببطو بزببح “Homeland  Party,”  official  party  established  by 
Najibullah after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The Hezb-i Watan was essentially a 
reorganized  PDPA  which  promoted  more  nationalist,  rather  than  communist 
ideologies.  
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Hotaki:  Pash. یکتوه, sub-tribe of the Ghilzai confederation. Under the leadership of 
Mir Wais, the Hotaki revolted against the Safavid Empire in 1709. 
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): The Pakistani foreign intelligence service.
Jamaat-i  Islami:  Pers.  یملبسا تعابمج “Islamic  Congregation,”  Islamist  organization 
under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani active during the anti-Soviet jihad. 
jihad: Ar. داهج, from دهج “to endeavor or strive,” a religiously sanctioned war. 
jirga:  Pash.  هبګرج,  an  assembly  of  elders  in  Pashtun communities  that  serves  the 
functions of local governance, including dispute resolution and juridical matters. 
Junbish-i  Milli:  Uz.  “National  Movement”  ethnic-Uzbek  militia  commanded  by 
Abdul Rashid Dostum. 
Kafiri:  From  Ar.  رفاك “disbeliever or infidel,” used to describe the communities of 
contemporary Nuristan that were not converted to Islam until 1896. 
kamanda:  Pers. هدنامرف, from the Fr. “commander,” used during the anti-Soviet jihad 
to describe a military leader from outside of the traditional political structure of his 
group, e.g. Ahmad Shah Massoud.  
Khedmat-i  Etala’at-i  Dawlati  (KhAD):  Pers.   یتببلود تاببعلطا تامدببخ “Government 
Intelligence Service,” Afghan intelligence service established in 1980 with advice and 
technical support from the Soviet KGB. 
Khalq:  Pash. قلخ “Masses,” faction of the PDPA primarily composed of Pashtuns. 
Following the Leninist model, the Khalq sought (over the objections of their Soviet 
advisors) to implement radical reform and create a working-class party. The Khalq 
government was overthrown by the Soviet invasion in December 1979.
khan:  Turk.  ناخ “sovereign  or  military  leader,”  first  used in  medieval  Tartary.  In 
contemporary Afghanistan, a khan is used as an honorific, similar to effendi, and to 
refer to large landlords.   
Khawanin Mulki:  Pash.  یکلم  نيناوخ “Landowning gentlemen” who comprised the 
lower advisory councils of Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) and Amanullah (1919-29). 
Khorasan: From Middle Pers. ناسارخ “land where the sun rises,” traditionally used by 
Persians to refer to greater Central Asia. 
kulak:  Ru. кулак  “fist”  referring  to  “tight-fisted”  rich  peasants  and  wealthy 
independent farmers in the late Russian Empire who held economic, as well as local 
political authority. 
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malik: Ar.كلام  “owner or possessor,” used in Afghanistan as a title for large landlords 
and village leaders. 
Mohammadzai: Pash. یز دمحم  “sons of Mohammad,” one of the four major Durrani 
Pashtun descent groups.
Mujahedeen: Ar. نیدهاجم “Those who engage in jihad”
mullah: Pers. لم from Ar. ىلَ وم  “vicar or master,” used as a title for religious leaders 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia. 
Musahiban:  Pers. نابحابصم “attendants,”  title  adopted  as  a  family  name  by  Nadir 
Shah’s brother-in-law Yusuf Khan, a prominent  official  in Habibullah’s (1901-19) 
court.  
mutasib:  Ar. بستحم “one who accounts,” title for individual who supervises bazaars, 
trade,  and  other  aspects  of  public  life  to  insure  that  business  is  conducted  in 
accordance with Islamic law. 
nang: Pash. نانګ  “to protect one’s right,” honor 
namus:  Ar. سومان “law, custom, honor,” He. אסומונ “law,” Gr. νόμος “custom,” used 
in Afghanistan to describe the importance of protecting the virtue of women.   
pakul: Pash. پلوك   round wool cap named for a settlement in Chitral, Pakistan, where 
it is believed to originate.  The cap is one of the most popular men’s headwear in 
Afghanistan. 
Parcham:  Pers. مچرپ “Banner,”  faction of  the PDPA primarily  comprised  on non-
Pashtuns. The Parcham advocated a more gradual approach to socialism than their 
Khalq rivals and garnered greater support from the Soviet Union. 
Parun: Valley in central Nuristan province. 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA): Pers. ناتسناغفا قلخ کيتارکومد بزح, 
communist party of Afghanistan established in 1965 and ruled from 1978 to 1992. 
Pashai: Dardic ethnic group that inhabits the border area of northeastern Afghanistan. 
qaryadar: From Ar.  رق “settlement” and Pers. راد  “owner,” village headman.  
qawm:  Ar.  موببق  “kin,  tribe,  race,”  used  in  Afghanistan  as  a  gloss  for  social 
organizations  based  on  tribal,  clan,  kinship,  or  locality  ties.  Sometimes  used 
interchangeably with “tribe.” 
121
Sazeman-i  Ettela'at  va  Amniyat-e  Keshvar  (SAVAK):  Pers.  تبينما و تابعلطا نامزاس 
روشک “National Intelligence and Security Organization,” Iranian domestic and foreign 
intelligence service under the Shah that operated from 1957 to 1979.  
sazi:  From  Km.  “teams,”  a  fifty-man  sub-tribal  governance  structure  in  Kom 
communities  that  fulfills  the  community’s  obligations  of  justice,  defense,  and 
maintenance.   
Shar’ia: Ar. ةعیرش “way or path,” Islamic jurisprudence derived from the Qur’an and 
the Hadith  
shura: Ar. ىروش “consultation,” a decision-making body  
Shura-i Nazar-i Shamali:  Pers. یلامش  رظان  ىروش “Supervisory Council of the North” 
(SCN) council  created by Ahmad Shah Massoud in 1984 comprised of about 130 
mujahedeen commanders allied with Rabbani’s Jamaat-i Islami.  
taliban:  Pers.  and  Pash. plural  of  Ar. بلاببط “student,”  used  in  Afghanistan  and 
Pakistan to refer to religious student. 
tarburwali:  Pash.  لوروبرتي  “rivalry with male cousin on father’s  side,” marked by 
endemic gamesmanship and sometimes open hostility 
Wama: Valley in southern Nuristan province populated by Ashku, Sanu, and Kata 
ethnic groups.  
waqf: From Ar.  فقو “to stop,” inalienable religious endowment administered by the 
clergy
watan:  Ar.  نببطو “homeland,”  used  to  designate  political  entity,  in  contrast  with 
religious and ethnic communities. 
Waygal: Valley in eastern Nuristan inhabited largely by the Kalash Nuristani ethnic 
group. 
wurjeṣṭ:  Derived  from  Km. jeṣṭ,  “leader  or  chief”  in  Kom tribal  communities  in 
eastern Nuristan.
za’im: Ar. ميعز “leader” with economic and political authority over his constituents. 
122
Bibliography
Aabid,  Mohammed,  Al’asabiyah  Wad’dawlah:  Ma’alem  Nazariyah   Fit’tarikh  
Aleslami (The Asabiyah and the State:  Khaldounic Theoretical  Features in Islamic 
History). Beirut: Markaz Derasat Alwehdah Alarabiyah, 1992. 
Abdur  Rahim,  Muhammad,  The  History  of  Afghans  in  India:  AD  1545–1631. 
Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1961.
Adamec,  Ludwig W.,  Dictionary  of  Afghan Wars,  Revolutions,  and Insurgencies. 
Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1996. 
“Afghan Regional  Leader  Says  Decentralization  Key to  Country’s  Future,”  Radio 
Free Europe, October 2, 2010. 
Akiner, Shirin, “Melting pot, salad bowl - cauldron? Manipulation and mobilization 
of ethnic and religious identities in Central Asia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 20, 
No. 2 (April 1997).
Aldrich,  Robert,  Greater  France:  A History of  French Overseas Expansion.  New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, 30.  
Anderson, Lisa,  The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya (1830-
1980). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. 
Anderson,  Jon W.,  “There are no ‘Khans’ Anymore:  Economic  Development  and 
Social Change in Tribal Afghanistan,”  Middle East Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 
1978). 
Annen, Niels, “Echoes of the Soviet Surge,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2011. 
Azimi,  Mohammad  Nabi,  Urdu wa Siyasat  dar  Seh  Daheh Akheer-e  Afghanistan 
(The Army and Politics in the Last Three Decades in Afghanistan). Peshawar: Marka-
e Nashrati Mayvand, 1998. 
Barr, James,  Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain’s Secret War in  
Arabia, 1916-1918. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008. 
Barfield,  Thomas,  Afghanistan:  A  Cultural  and  Political  History.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010.
———,“Problems Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 37,
123
 No. 2 (2004).
———, “Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure 
and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace.” Agrarian Colloquium Series: 
“Hinterlands,  Frontiers,  Cities  and  States:  Transactions  and  Identities.”  Yale 
University, February 23, 2007.
Barth, Fredrik,  Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 
1965.  
———, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1998.
Bernsten, Gary,  Jawbreaker:  The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal  
Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander. New York: Broadway Publishing, 2006. 
Bosen,  Inger,  From  Subjects  to  Citizens:  Local  Participation  in  the  National  
Solidarity  Programme.  Kabul:  Afghanistan  Research  and  Evaluation  Unit  Report 
(August 2004). 
Bumiller, Elisabeth, “Remembering Afghanistan’s Golden Age,”  New York Times, 
October 18, 2009.
Burke, William J., “Tribe and State in the 21st Century: The Tribe-ocracy of Oman.” 
BA thesis, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, 2010.
Burn, A.R., Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Empire. New York: Macmillan, 
1962.
Canfield,  Robert,  “Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Alignments in Afghanistan,” in 
The State  Religion,  and Ethnic  Politics:  Afghanistan,  Iran,  and Pakistan,  ed.  Ali 
Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986.
Coburn,  Noah,  Losing  Legitimacy?:  Some  Afghan  views  on  the  government,  the  
international community, and the 2009 elections. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit Post-Elections Brief (November 2009). 
———,  Connecting with Kabul: The importance of the  Wolesi Jirga election and 
local political networks in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit Parliamentary Election Brief (May 2010).
Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden,  
from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004. 
The Committee of Imperial Defence, “Minutes of Meeting on the Defence of India, 
April 30, 1903,” British National Archives, Ref. CAB 38/2.   
124
Crile, George, Charlie Wilson’s War. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003. 
Danspeckgruber,  Wolfgang  and  Robert  Finn,  Building  State  &  Security  in  
Afghanistan. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010. 
Dobbins, James, After the Taliban: Nation Building in Afghanistan. Dulles: Potomac 
Books, 2008. 
Dorronsoro,  Gilles,  Revolution  Unending.  New York:  Columbia  University  Press, 
2005. 
Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
Dunbar, R.I.M., “Neocortex Size as a Constraint on Group Size in Primates,” Journal  
of Human Evolution, Vol. 22, No. 6 (June 1992). 
Edelberg,  Lennart,  “Nuristanske  Sølvpokaler,”  Kuml,  Den  jyske  Arkæologiske 
Selskab, 1965. 
Edelberg,  Lennart,  “Statues  de  Bois:  Rapportees  du  Kafiristan  a  Kabul  après  la 
conquete  de  cette  Province  par  l’Emir  Abdul  Rahman,”  Arts  Asiatiques,  Vol.  3 
(1965). 
Edwards, David B.,  Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 1996. 
Elman,  Miriam  Fendius,  “The  Foreign  Policies  of  Small  States:  Challenging 
Neorealism in its Own Backyard,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 2 
(April 1995).
Ewans, Martin,  Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics. New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2002.  
Farivar,  Masood,  Confessions of  a  Mullah Warrior.  New York:  Atlantic  Monthly 
Press, 2009. 
Giustozzi, Antonio, Empires of Mud. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
———,  Koran,  Kalashnikov,  and  Laptop:  The  Neo-Taliban  Insurgency  in  
Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 
Glasser, Susan, “Giving up at Tora Bora,” The Washington Post, December 21, 2009.
Glete, Jan, War and the State in Early Modern Europe. London: Routledge, 2001.
125
Goodson, Larry P.,  Afghanistan’s Endless War.  Seattle:  University of Washington 
Press, 2001.
Grau, Lester W., “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal 
from Afghanistan,”  The Journal of Slavic Military Studies¸ Vol. 28, Issue 2 (April-
June 2007).  
Gregorian,  Vartan,  The  Emergence  of  Modern  Afghanistan.  Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 1969.
Griffin,  Michael,  Reaping  the  Whirlwind:  The  Taliban Movement  in  Afghanistan. 
London: Pluto Press, 2001. 
Hart, David, Qabila: Tribal Profiles and Tribe-State Relations in Morocco and on the  
Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier. Amsterdam: Het Spinuis, 2001. 
Hopkirk,  Peter,  The Great  Game: The Struggle for Empire in  Central  Asia.  New 
York: Kodansha International, 1992. 
Ibn Khaldun,  The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. trans. Fran Rozenthal, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958.
Isby,  David C.,  War in a Distant  Country,  Afghanistan:  Invasion and Resistance. 
London: Arms and Armour, 1989. 
Jones, Seth, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2010.
———, “It Takes the Villages,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (May/June 2010). 
Junger, Sebastian, War. New York: Twelve Hachette, 2010. 
Kaplan,  Robert  D.,  Soldiers  of  God:  With  Islamic  Warriors  in  Afghanistan  and 
Pakistan. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. 
Karzai, Ahmad Wali, “Letter to the Editor,”  The New York Times, September 30, 
2010. 
Katz,  David J.,  “Responses to Central  Authority in Nuristan: The Case of Väygal 
Valley  Kalasha,”  in  Revolutions  and  Rebellions  in  Afghanistan:  Anthropological  
Perspectives,  ed.  Nazif  Shahrani  and  Robert  Canfield. Berkley:  University  of 
California Press, 1984. 
Khoury, Philip and Joseph Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East. 
Berkley: University of California Press, 1991. 
126
Klimburg,  Max,  “A  Tense  Autonomy:  The  Present  Situation  in  Nuristan,” 
Afghanistan:  A  Country  without  a  State,  ed.  Christine  Noelle-Karmi,  Conrad  J. 
Schetter, and Reinhard Schlagintweit. Frankfurt am Main: IKO, 2001. 
Lamborn,  Alan,  “Power  and  the  Politics  of  Extraction,”  International  Studies  
Quarterly Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1983).
Larson,  Anna,  Democratization  and  Elections.  Kabul:  Afghanistan  Research  and 
Evaluation Unit Policy Note (March 2010).  
Lawrence, T.E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom: a Triumph. New York: Doubleday, Doran 
& Company, 1936.
Lindholm, Charles, “Kinship Structure and Political Authority: The Middle East and 
Central  Asia,”  Comparative Studies in Society and History,  Vol.  28, No. 2 (April 
1986). 
Lister,  Sarah,  Caught  in  Confusion:  local  governance  structures  in  Afghanistan. 
Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper (March 2005). 
Lyon, David, In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American  
Occupation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
MacIntyre,  Benjamin,  The  Man  Who  Would  Be  King:  The  First  American  in  
Afghanistan. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2005. 
MacMunn,  George,  Afghanistan:  From Darius  to  Amanullah.  London:  G.  Bell  & 
Sons Ltd., 1929.
Mascelloni, Enrico, War Rugs: The Nightmare of Modernism. Milan: Skira, 2009. 
McGovern, William, The Early Empires of Central Asia. Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1939. 
Migdal,  Joel,  Strong  Societies  and  Weak  States.  Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press, 1988. 
Mahomed Khan, Mir Sultan, ed.,  The Life of Abdur Rahman: Amir of Afghanistan. 
London: John Murray Publishers, 1900.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, “Afghanistan - Security Services 
in Communist Afghanistan (1978-1992). AGSA, KAM, KhAD and WAD,” April 26, 
2001. 
Montero, David, “Why the Taliban appeal to Pakistani youth,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, June, 16, 2006. 
127
Newell, Nancy Peabody and Richard S. Newell, The Struggle for Afghanistan. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981. 
Nixon,  Hamish,  The  Changing  Face  of  Local  Governance?:  Community  
Development Councils in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation 
Unit Report (February 2008). 
———, Subnational State-Building in Afghanistan. Kabul: Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit Report (April 2008).
Noelle,  Christine,  State  and Tribe  in  Nineteenth  Century  Afghanistan.  Richmond: 
Curzon Press, 1997.
Nojumi,  Neamatollah,“The Rise and Fall  of the Taliban,”  in  The Taliban and the 
Crisis  of  Afghanistan,  ed.  Robert  Crews  and  Amin  Tarzi.  Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 2008. 
Nyrop, Richard F. and Donald M. Seekins, ed.,  Afghanistan: A Country Study, The 
American University, January 1986. 
Oakes,  Dan,  “Australia’s  helping  hand  to  warlord  condemned,”  Sydney  Morning 
Herald, November, 2, 2010. 
Phillips,  E.D.,  The  Royal  Hordes:  Nomad  Peoples  of  the  Steppes.  New  York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
Poullada,  Leon  B.,  Reform  and  Rebellion  in  Afghanistan,  1919-1929:  King 
Amanaullah’s  Failure  to  Modernize  a  Tribal  Society.  Ithaca:  Cornell  University 
Press, 1973. 
Putnam,  Robert  D.,  Making  Democracy  Work:  Civic  Traditions  in  Modern  Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
Quintus Curtis Rufus,  History of Alexander. Book 2, Vol. 6, trans. John C. Rolfe. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946.
Qayoumi,  Mohammad,  “Once  Upon  a  Time  in  Afghanistan…”  Foreign  Policy, 
May/June 2010. 
Rashid, Ahmad, Descent into Chaos. New York: Viking Press, 2008. 
———, Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
———,  “Afghan  Resistance  Leader  Feared  Dead  in  Blast,”  The  Telegraph, 
September, 11, 2001. 
128
Rice, Tamara Talbot,  Ancient Arts of Central Asia. Westport: Frederick A. Praeger 
Publishers, 1965.
Ricks,  Thomas,  Fiasco:  The  American  Military  Adventure  in  Iraq.  New  York: 
Penguin Press, 2006.
———, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure  
in Iraq, 200 –2008. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.  
Risen, James, “Karzai’s Kin Use Ties to Gain Power in Afghanistan,” The New York 
Times, October 5, 2010. 
Robertson,  George,  The Kafirs  of  the  Hindu Kush.  London:  Lawrence  & Bullen, 
1896. 
Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
Rubin, Alyssa J. and Damien Cave, “In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict,” 
New York Times, December 23, 2007. 
Rubin, Barnett R.,  The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2002
———, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,”  Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, 
No. 3 (July 2004). 
———, “Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty 
for whose security?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2006). 
Rubin, Barnett R. and Helena Malikyar,  The Politics of Center-Periphery Relations  
in Afghanistan, New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2003.
Russell,  James  A.,  Innovation,  Transformation,  and  War:  Counterinsurgency 
Operations  in  Anbar and Ninewa Provinces,  Iraq,  2005–2007.  Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 2011.
Said, Edward, Orientalism. New York: Vintage Press, 2003.
Salzman, Phillip, “Tribal Chiefs as Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation in the 
Middle East,” in Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 1974).
Schroen, Gary C,  First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the  
War on Terror in Afghanistan. New York: Random House, 2005. 
129
Schneiter, Vincent, “La Guerre de Liberation au Nouristan (julliet 1978-mars 1979),” 
Les Temps Moderne (July-August 1980). 
Schultheis, Robert,  “Afghanistan: Barrage and Counter Barrage,”  Time, October 6, 
1986. 
Shahrani, Nazif, “Ethnic Relations under Closed Frontier Conditions,”  Soviet Asian 
Ethnic Frontiers, ed. William O. McCagg, Jr. and Brian D. Silver. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1979. 
———, “’From Tribe to Ummah’: Comments on the Dynamics of Identity in Muslim 
Soviet Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1984). 
———,  “State  Building  and  Social  Fragmentation  in  Afghanistan:  A  Historical 
Perspective,”  in  The  State,  Religion,  and  Ethnic  Politics:  Afghanistan,  Iran,  and 
Pakistan, ed. Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1986.
———, “The Kirghiz Khans: Styles and Substance of Traditional Local Leadership 
in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1986).
———, “The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in 
Afghanistan,”  Fundamentalism Reborn? ed. William Maley. London: Hurst & Co., 
1988.
———,  “Afghanistan:  State  and  Society  in  Retrospect,”  The  Cultural  Basis  of  
Afghan  Nationalism,  ed.  Ewan  Anderson  and  Nancy  Dupree.  London:  Pinter 
Publishers, 1990.
———, “War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan,” American Anthropologist, 
Vol. 104, No. 3 (September 2002). 
Sidky,  H., “War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational 
Violence in Afghanistan: 1978-2001,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2007). 
Singh, Ganda,  Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of Modern Afghanistan. Bombay:  Asia 
Publishing House, 1959.
Sinno, Abdulkader, “Explaining the Taliban’s Ability to Mobilize the Pashtuns,” The 
Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, ed. Robert Crews and Amin Tarzi. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2008. 
Smith, Deborah J. and Jay Lamey, A holistic justice system for Afghanistan. Kabul: 
Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Policy Note (December 2009). 
Stewart, Rory, The Places in Between. Boston: Mariner Books, 2006. 
130
Strand, Richard, “Anti-Communist Resistance in Eastern Nuristan,” in  Revolutions  
and Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Nazif Shahrani and 
Robert Canfield. Berkley: University of California Press, 1984. 
———, “A Note on Rank,  Political  Leadership  and Government  among the  Pre-
Islamic  Kom,”  Cultures  of  the  Hindukush,  Selected  Papers  from the  Hindu-Kush 
Cultural Conference held at Moesgård, Denmark, 1970. 
———, “Principles of Kinship Organization among the Kom Nuristani,” Cultures of  
the Hindukush,  Selected Papers from the Hindu-Kush Cultural  Conference held at 
Moesgård, Denmark, 1970. 
Tanin,  Zaher,  Afghanistan  dar  Qarn-I  Bistom  (Afghanistan  in  the  Twentieth 
Century). Kabul: Muhammad Ibrahim Shariati Afghani Press, 2005. 
Tapper, Richard, The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1983. 
———,  “Anthropologists,  Historians,  and  Tribespeople,”  Tribes  and  State  
Formation  in  the  Middle  East,  ed.  Philip  Khoury  and  Joseph  Kostiner.  Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1991. 
Tapper,  Nancy,  “Causes  and Consequences  of  the  Abolition  of  the  Brideprice  in 
Afghanistan,”  in  Revolutions  and  Rebellions  in  Afghanistan:  Anthropological  
Perspectives,  ed.  Nazif  Shahrani  and  Robert  Canfield. Berkley:  University  of 
California Press, 1984.
Tarn, William, Alexander the Great. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European States. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
De Tocqueville, Alexis,  Democracy in America. New York: E. Walker Publishing, 
1858.
Van Der  Schriek,  Daan, “Nuristan:  Insurgent  Hideout  in Afghanistan,”  Terrorism 
Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 10 (May 2006).
“The Visit of King Amanullah,” The Modern Review, January 1928.  
Walt,  Stephen  M.,  “Alliance  Formation  and  the  Balance  of  World  Power,” 
International Security Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985).
Waltz,  Kenneth,  Theory  of  International  Politics.  Long  Grove:  Waveland  Press, 
2010.
131
Weatherford, Jack, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. New York: 
Crown Publishing, 2003. 
West, Bing, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq. New York: 
Random House, 2008.
Wilber, Donald, Afghanistan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 
Windham,  Charles,  Précis  on  Afghan  Affairs,  Government  of  India  Foreign  and 
Political Department, 1914.
“Wine and Tulips in Kabul,” The Economist, December 16, 2010.  
Wooten, Paul, “Trade and Empire: The Royal Navy, Iran, and the Persian Gulf,” Al-
Noor, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2010).
132
